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As someone who is a vaguely guilty white,
Western European Brit, the rationalization is
this: it was necessary for us to be strong. And
how did we do that? We oppressed your
people, we took your resources. But in
retrospect, we realize we might not have done
it quite right. But now we disapprove of you
doing the same. And because of our slight
guilt, we can’t apologize. I once asked Mary
Robinson, why don’t we apologize? Why is
that not a diplomatic tool?
And she
responded, ‘well, you can’t apologize for what
you’re still doing.1

* Assistant professor at the Charleston School of Law, Charleston,
South Carolina; J.D., Boston College Law School; B.A., Wellesley College;
former associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP largely
practicing in structured finance. Many thanks to my fearless research
assistant, Elizabeth Wallace Hodges. Thank you to the participants of both
the Southeastern Law Scholars Conference held on Sept. 21, 2012 in
Charleston, South Carolina and the LatCrit XIV Conference held on Oct. 6–8,
2011 in San Diego, California who offered tremendous feedback. And
finally, I have great appreciation for Carmen González, Sheila Scheuerman,
and Jorge Roig for their invaluable comments.
1
Julia Ormond, actress and human rights activist, on supply chain
slavery at the 2012 Oslo Freedom Forum (OFF 2012). Supply chain slavery
is the idea that bondage is used at every stage of production in the supply of
many goods globally. See Julia Ormond, Supply Chain Slavery, Address at
Oslo Freedom Forum (May 8, 2012), (transcript available at
http://www.oslofreedomforum.com/blog/2012/05/08/julia-ormond-supplychain-slavery/). OFF 2012 is a conference that brings together policy makers,
world leaders, and humanitarians on the issue of human rights in much the
same way as the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland brings
together policy makers, global leaders, and capital markets leaders together
on the issue of world finance and trade.
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INTRODUCTION
During the 1600s, sugar2 represented one of the early fetishes3 of
foreign capital with a particular commodity, appropriated for its
ultimate stimulation of pleasure in the European upper classes.4 For
the Europeans, sugar was a commodity of luxury, like diamonds or
gold, with great social value but no intrinsic productive capacity.5
2
The sugar that is the subject of this article is derived from the
sugarcane plant, as opposed to the sugar beet, through a crushing and
extracting process. See F. Schneider Jr., Sugar, 4 FOREIGN AFF. 311, 311–20
(1926) (recounting history of sugar before “discovery” by Europeans).
3
The term fetish is a powerful term, expressing multiple notions of
fantasy, objectification, and illusion—concepts that are a strong subtext in
this paper. The term fetish is derived in part from the Portuguese term feitiço,
which was used to describe the fascination of religious objects for their
mystical or magical powers. See William Pietz, The Problem of the Fetish, I,
9 RES: ANTHROPOLOGY & AESTHETICS 5, 5 (Spring 1985); Ruth Landes,
Fetish Worship in Brazil, 53 THE J. OF AM. FOLKLORE, Oct.—Dec. 1940, at
261, 261. Karl Marx then adopted the term to signify the notion that
commodities, the most fundamental building block of capital, are themselves
magical as if naturally possessing value outside the value derived from
human manipulation. See ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, MARXISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 103 (1980). Here, however, I invoke the term for three reasons:
First, the term here is homage to Marx. Second, I invoke Professor Anthony
Farley’s usage, which articulates a certain race-pleasure derived from the
African-American body, the “Black” body as subjugated object. See
Anthony P. Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457,
464–67 (Fall 1997). For me, and this is the third reason, the term signifies
the historical obsession (the erotic and exotic perceptions) that Europeans
have had with Latin America.
4
See SIDNEY W. MINTZ, SWEETNESS AND POWER: THE PLACE OF SUGAR
IN MODERN HISTORY (1985). Mintz is a professor of anthropology and a
scholar of power and the human condition. He is a prominent scholar on the
role of sugar in society, with his book at once critiqued and revered as a
landmark piece. See also EDUARDO GALEANO, OPEN VEINS OF LATIN
AMERICA: FIVE CENTURIES OF THE PILLAGE OF A CONTINENT 1–3 (1997).
Sugar also has a unique place in Latin American and Caribbean history as
creating sugar monocultures—economies dependent on the export of sugar.
5
Essentially, a commodity is the starting point of production, a thing
(often a natural resource) that potentially has two independent types of value,
which express two different phenomenon: intrinsic value (value of the thing
in and of itself) and productive value (value as shaped by relationships). For
Karl Marx, the commodity is the relevant starting point when critiquing
capital because it is the simplest expression of the entire system.
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Eventually, however, this quality of luxury diminished as sugar
became accessible, and ultimately a necessity, to the masses
primarily as a food source.6
The seductive qualities of sugar as commodity have evolved
once again, as sugarcane has come to represent another possibility in
the world of alternative fuels.7 This article, for example, shows that
HEILBRONER, supra note 3, at 96. For both philosopher Adam Smith and
Marx, these reflect the concepts of use-value and exchange-value. For Smith,
“Nothing is more useful than water: But it will purchase scarce anything;
scarce anything can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary,
has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may
frequently be had in exchange for it.” ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS ch. 4 (1776); see also CHRIS HARMAN, ZOMBIE CAPITALISM:
GLOBAL CRISIS AND THE RELEVANCE OF MARX 22 (2010). For Marx, “A
commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us, a thing that by its
properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another. The nature of such
wants, whether for instance, they spring from the stomach or from fancy,
makes no difference.” Karl Marx, Capital, in THE PORTABLE KARL MARX
437, 437 (Eugene Kamenka ed. & trans., 1983). The concept of value being
intrinsic to a thing immediately appears in quite bluntly. Id. at n.3 (“Things
have intrinsick virtue.”). Value, however, is a fictional concept and may or
may not be characterized by the price that a good trades for. Productive
value is considered to be value that is derived through the laborious process
that transforms a thing into something with an exchange value that prior to
the transformation was not present intrinsically.
6
In Sweetness & Power, Mintz explains that the evolution of sugar,
from item of “luxury” and “rarity” to what he calls a “mass-produced exotic
necessity of a proletarian working class,” is a function of economic forces
creating a specific social result:
As the production of sugar became significant
economically, so that it could affect political and military
(as well as economic) decisions, its consumption by the
powerful came to matter less; at the same time, the
production of sugar acquired the importance precisely
because the masses of English people were now steadily
consuming more of it, and desiring more of it than they
could afford.
MINTZ, supra note 4, at 45–46. Raj Patel, a policy analyst and scholar, also
recognizes the significant presence of sugar in the diet of the masses. See
RAJ PATEL, STUFFED & STARVED: THE HIDDEN BATTLE FOR THE WORLD FOOD
SYSTEM (2010) (exploring the cultural and systemic variables that are at once
the basis for global starvation and obesity).
7
The idea that there is value in sugar as fuel is not innovative. In a
1925 New York Times piece, Henry Ford made the statement that “ethyl

2013]

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF CAPITAL, SLAVE
LABOR, AND THE LANGUAGE OF PROFIT IN THE
MARKET FOR SUGAR ETHANOL

287

the value of sugar as commodity is no longer driven by sugar’s
characteristic as food, but is instead driven by sugar’s potential to
replace oil as energy.8 Sugar has thus quietly reemerged as one of
alcohol was the fuel of the future.” Ford Predicts Fuel from Vegetation, N.
Y. TIMES, Sep. 20, 1925, at 24. As it relates to Brazil, the case study in this
paper, the series of energy crises in the 1970s prompted Brazil’s government
to consider alternative forms of energy, and it was then that the country
began developing sugar ethanol for internal consumption. In my research for
this paper, I came to understand the highly politicized and polarized nature
of discussions surrounding ethanol. Groups seem to fall into two camps: (1)
those that argue that we need to reduce our dependence on oil and clean fuel
developed from biomass and (2) those that argue that the undesirable effects
of biofuel, e.g., the direct (deforestation) and indirect (use of oil during
global transportation) impact on the environment. The latter group also
argues that the use of food for the purpose of making a car run is
detrimentally affecting the food supply by making global food prices higher.
The arguments are not necessarily aligned along political lines. See Robert
Bryce, Ethanol: Feed a Person for a Year or Fill Up an SUV?, ALTERNET
(Mar. 5, 2007), http://www.alternet.org/story/48790/ethano l%3A_feed_a_
person_for_a_year_or_fill_up_an_suv (discussing paper published by
conservative researcher arguing that ethanol cannot satisfy U.S. demand for
fuel and that the issue of ethanol is a moral one, not a political, national
security, oil-related one); see also infra note 16.
8
See Christine Bolling & Nydia R. Suarez, The Brazilian Sugar
Industry: Recent Developments, in SUGAR AND SWEETENER: SITUATION AND
OUTLOOK REPORT 14, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., (Sept.
2001),
available
at
http://usda01.library.cornell.edu/usda/ers/SSS/
2000s/2001/SSS-09-27-2001.pdf (discussing ethanol as the primary use of
cane sugar). In addition, a 2008 World Bank report very clearly recognizes a
correlation between increased global food prices and the demand for food
crops for the purpose of biofuel production. See Donald Mitchell, A Note on
Rising Food Prices (Apr. 8, 2008), http://image.guardian.co.uk/sysfiles/Environment/documents/2008/07/10/Biofuels.PDF (“Increased biofuel
production has increased the demand for food crops and been the major
cause of the increase in food prices.”) (emphasis omitted). Furthermore, and
perhaps more compelling to me, is the investment activity of both energy and
food corporations in the alternative energy sector. For example, the
homepage of DuPont Biofuels, a subsidiary of the chemical company
DuPont, states, “We also are looking at ways to increase agricultural
productivity, and enhance the attributes of certain crops that are most useful
for biofuel technologies.” See DUPONT BIOFUELS (Mar. 31, 2013),
http://www2.dupont.com/BioFuel/en_US/about/index.html; see also Jim
Lane, Cargill to Open Brazil Biodiesel Plant this Month, BIOFUELS DIGEST
(Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2012/08/27/cargill
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the more sought after commodities because of its relevance in the
production of alternative energy. 9 The fetish in sugar is no longer
sweetness and luxury. Instead, the fetish has evolved as the market
discovers that there are magnificent profit yields in biofuel.10

to-open-brazil-biodiesel-plant-this-month/; Press Release, Monsanto
Company, Monsanto Company and Mendel Biotechnology Announce
Cellulosic Biofuels Collaboration (Apr. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/monsanto-company-and-mendelbiotechnology-announce-cellulosic-biofuels-collaboration-57529502.html.
Ironically, Cargill announced the closing of its biofuel plant in Germany.
See Cargill closes a German biodiesel plant on overcapacity, REUTERS (Nov.
7, 2012, 8:47 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/cargillbiodiesel-germany-idAFL5E8M7BXX20121107. In addition, later in this
article I discuss joint ventures involving BP and Royal Dutch Shell most
notably.
9
See Bolling & Suarez, supra note 8; see also Constanza Valdes,
Brazil’s Ethanol Industry: Looking Forward, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON.
RESEARCH SERV., (June 2011), available at http://www.ers.usda.
gov/media/126865/bio02.pdf (examining the development of the sugar
ethanol industry in Brazil and considering complications over the next ten
years).
10
The reach for profitability within the biomass industry extends
dramatically into the realm of pharmaceuticals, seed cultivation, food, energy,
intellectual property, the market for sequestration of greenhouse gases, and
synthetic genomes. See Ted Agres, Rescues Around the World, SCIENTIFIC
AM. WORLDVIEW: A GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVE, 2009, at 28,
available at http://www.saworldview.com/files/dmfile/SAWorldview.pdf.
The article explores the ways in which companies are lobbying legislatures
to provide significant tax credits, changes to accounting rules, or both, to
foster investment. In the United States, for example, a Canadian trade
association is trying to influence Congressional legislation that would “allow
companies to accelerate net operating losses and to take research and
development tax credits as a deduction against future earnings, but at a
discount from what they otherwise would have been.” Id. at 28. J. Craig
Ventor, founder and CEO of Synthetic Genomics, Inc., a privately held
company funded in part by BP plc, is said to have stated that “[w]hoever
produces abundant biofuels could end up making more than just big bucks –
they will make history . . . The companies, the countries, that succeed in this
will be the economic winners of the next age to the same extent that the oilrich nations are today.” See DIANA BRONSON ET AL., ETC GROUP, EARTH
GRAB: GEOPIRACY, THE NEW BIOMASSTERS AND CAPTURING CLIMATE GENES
52 (2011); see also SYNTHETIC GENOMICS, http://www.synthetic
genomics.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). Synthetic Genomics, Inc. is
creating a market in innovation, specifically in the genetic modification of
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Sugar as now financed and traded 11 derives its value in the
modern market not just from productive capital (i.e., from the actual
growing, processing, and trading of sugarcane). Value is also
derived from the layers of complex (structured) financing
arrangements that are intended to either mitigate risk or create a
separate market in the trade of derivative contracts or energy trade
agreements.12 Thus, the sugar trade is one which represents multiple,
complex layers of business and finance activity. Notwithstanding the
complexities, however, sugar continues to represent power
hierarchies that permeate social, political, and economic
relationships. 13 The power of sugar in organizing society is
phenomenal and unmistakable.14

biomass and other organisms, so as to create synthetic forms of fuel. On the
historical interest of foreign capital with natural resources, see also Antonia
Darder, Schooling and the Empire of Capital: Unleashing the Contradiction,
50 VILL. L. REV. 847, 851 (2009) (“Then, as today, the empire of capital
sought global conquest, through a singular political economy. While in an
earlier time, conquest was focused on raw materials and natural resources for
the expansion of industrial capabilities, global conquest today is tied to the
control of labor, natural resources and the market place.”).
11
Sugar as a raw commodity is traded on the New York Board of
Trade as the Sugar No. 11 futures contract for physical delivery. The price
of the contract is sensitive to changes in supply arising from problems with
cultivation and production. Most sugar exports come from either Brazil or
India. See Bolling & Suarez, supra note 8, at 14. Any time the crop in these
countries is less than expected, as a result of weather conditions, harvesting
issues, or equipment issues, the shortage is certain to trigger spikes in prices
due to unsatisfied demand. For example, in May 2012, The Financial Times
reported increased costs of production for sugar produced in Brazil, claiming
that while Brazil is dominant in the industry, the country’s advantage is
challenged as a result of variables ancillary to sugar production, including
currency exchange rates and lack of investment in infrastructure. See Joe
Leahy, Brazil Sugar Production Costs Rise, THE FIN. TIMES, May 15, 2012,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7e4e89f4-9eab-11e1-a767-00144feabdc0.htm
l#axzz21UpCvqW1.
12
For an examination of the role of derivatives and other financial
instruments in managing risk in project finance specifically in the Americas,
see Shalanda H. Baker, Unmasking Project Finance: Risk Mitigation, Risk
Inducement, and an Invitation to Development Disaster?, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS
& ENERGY L. 273 (2010–2011).
13
The notion of hierarchies, or of markets organizing society into
clusters of empowered and disempowered groups, whether by class, race,
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While this paper critically examines the relationship among
capital, labor, and natural resources in the sugar ethanol market, I
recognize the importance of foreign investment in creating jobs and
increasing the standard of living in formerly colonized capital-scarce
countries. I also recognize that a discussion of sugar ethanol is
particularly complex because of the current dilemma that global
economies face: continue dependence on a limited supply of fossil
fuel (the burning of which will lead to catastrophic climate change),15
or develop cleaner fuel methods that themselves create risks. 16
gender, etc., is an idea or theme that flows as a strong undertow or subtext in
this paper.
14
See MINTZ, supra note 4, at 45. See generally GALEANO, supra note
4; PATEL, supra note 6.
15
The issue of biofuel is an extremely political and polarizing one.
One can find as much research that pushes for biofuel as a viable substitute
for fossil fuels as one can find research that concludes that biofuels (1) cause
volatility in the commodities and global food markets, (2) are marginal in
their greenhouse gas emissions as compared to fossil fuels, and (3) harm the
environment. For example, in 2008 the World Bank released a report by two
of its economists that argued “the effect of biofuel on food prices has not
been as large as originally thought, but that the use of commodities by
financial investors (the so-called ‘financialization of commodities’) may
have been partly responsible for the 2007/08 spike.” John Baffes & Tassos
Haniotis, Placing the 2006/08 Commodity Price Boom into Perspective 2
(The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5371, 2010). This
report was wholly contradicted by the release of a “secret” internal memo
written by a researcher at the World Bank, which articulated great concern
for the massive impact of biofuel on food prices. See Mitchell, supra note 8
(stipulating that this is a “[d]raft, not for citation or circulation” and that
“[t]he views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be
attributed to the World Bank or its Executive Directors”); see also Aditya
Chakrabortty, Secret Report: Biofuel Caused Food Crisis, THE GUARDIAN
(July 3, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jul/03/ biofuels.
renewableenergy/print; Richard G. Luger & R. James Woolsey, The New
Petroleum, 78 FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 1999, at 88 (arguing in favor of
biofuels—largely second generation fuels derived from bacteria and yeast
feeding off sugar—because they reduce prospect of war, which necessarily
arises from oil dependence; also finding that biofuel is compatible with
existing infrastructure); A.C. Bedford, The World Oil Situation, 1 FOREIGN
AFF. 95, 96 (1923) (examining U.S. dependence on oil in 1923).
16
See C. Ford Runge & Benjamin Senauer, How Biofuels Could Starve
the Poor, 86 FOREIGN AFF., May–June 1997, at 41, 47 (“[B]iofuel industry
has long been dominated not by market forces but by politics and the
interests of a few large companies.”); see also Isabella Kenfield, Is Ethanol
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Notwithstanding these complexities, the thesis of this paper is that
the sugar ethanol market, as a means of alternative energy,
effectively recreates colonial patterns of forced labor, natural
resource degradation, and inequitable North-South distribution of the
costs and benefits of ethanol production. I argue that we cannot give
these externalities a “pass” simply because there is a pretext of being
“green.”17 I use this discussion to argue for a correction in how neoclassical economics defines value and profit.
* * *
To communicate this thesis, this paper is organized into three
parts. In Part I, I examine forced labor on sugarcane plantations and
the illusory notion that this practice is not tantamount to slavery
because workers are “free” to contract with their employers. I argue
the Solution or the Problem?, ALTERNET (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.alt
ernet.org/story/49138/is_ethanol_the_solution_or_the_problem (expressing
the idea that agribusiness in Brazil reaffirms the Portuguese colonial model
of economic growth and that “[b]iofuel production in Brazil ‘reproduce[s]
and legitimize[s] the logic of occupation of rural areas by multinational
agribusiness, and perpetuate[s] the colonial project to subvert ecosystems
and people to the service of the production and maintenance of a lifestyle in
other societies”); Charles R. P. Pouncy, Food, Globalism and Theory:
Marxian and Institutionalist Insights into the Global Food System, 43 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 89 (2011) (examining how world hunger is created
by corporate agendas and ideologies relating to food distribution and not
supply); Carmen G. González, The Global Food Crisis: Law, Policy, and the
Elusive Quest for Justice, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 462, 462 (2010);
Carmen G. González, Cluster 1: Theoretical Perspectives Introduction: The
Global Politics of Food, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 77, 77 (2011)
(“The immediate causes of skyrocketing food prices included rising
petroleum prices, adverse weather, burgeoning meat consumption, diversion
of agricultural land to biofuels production, and financial speculation in
agricultural commodity markets.”).
17
Kenfield, supra note 16 (“‘The problems with [sugarcane’s]
production today are very similar to the problems it generated hundreds of
years ago,’ says Maisa Mendoña, Director of the São Paulo-based NGO
Rede Social. Sugarcane fieldworkers endure some of the hardest labor in the
world.”); See also Jenna Scatena, Ethanol Is a Disaster, But What About
Other Fuels?, ALTERNET (Jan. 11, 1999), http://www.alternet.org/story/
118436/ethanol_is_a_disaster%2C_but_what_about_other_biofuels; Nicole
Colson, Corn, Incorporated: The Ethanol Scam, ALTERNET (Jul. 14, 2008),
http://www.alternet.org/story/91343/corn%2C_incorporated%3A_the_ethano
l_scam.
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that the formal equality created by the labor contract masks the
substantive inequality created by the coercive and exploitative
circumstances surrounding employment in the sugar plantations.
While the sugar ethanol industry may create market opportunities for
emerging economies like Brazil, it also perpetuates the legacy of
slavery.
In Part II, I analyze the impact of sugar ethanol production on
the relationship between the Global North and the Global South. I
consider the business and legal context in which foreign capital is
pouring funds into Brazil’s sugar market, and argue that the
allocation of power and wealth is distorted as (1) the capital source
continues to be powerful, and largely foreign, interests, and (2) those
with access to the asset or resources continue to be local, powerless,
and easily displaced landowners or farmers. The ethanol market and
ensuing sugar trade represents a troubling paradox. In Brazil, foreign
capital provides the necessary stimulation to develop a stagnating
ethanol market. However, such growth is at a cost as (1) natural
resources (e.g., sugarcane and the Amazon) are exploited, (2) the
value and wealth generated by the trade continue to benefit a foreign
minority, and (3) inhumanity continues to define the labor
conditions. As discussed herein, the business and legal environment
in Brazil is one that welcomes and is dependent on foreign capital.
In Part III, I consider the structures that reproduce colonial-era
inequities. While the market has discovered and produced a new
source of energy, one that will potentially remove the world’s
dependency on oil, the language and conduct that structures the
opportunity and capital environment remains the same. By language
and conduct, I mean the (1) neo-classical definition of profit, which I
posit is purposely misinformed or misdefined so as to minimize the
value of labor and at once subordinate human beings to the
imperatives of capital; and (2) idea that profit (as misconstrued) is
the sole agenda of private business with externalities (e.g.,
interference with food supply, destruction and pollution of the
environment, and poor working conditions) as acceptable collateral
damage. In regard to the Global North’s control of global markets,
this enables a small minority to reap the benefits of the sugar ethanol
industry while externalizing the costs of such industry on the people
and the natural environment of the Global South.
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In rethinking profit, and perhaps ultimately rethinking
capitalism,18 the challenge is to overcome the problem of whether the
change that is being proposed will actually produce a difference in
how rights are recognized and how resources are allocated. 19
Notwithstanding the highly theoretical and abstract nature of my
position, I believe that a change in language and conduct is the
important beginning.

I.

BLOOD TRANSACTIONS20: SUGAR AS THE NARRATIVE OF
BONDAGE
For in a very concrete way Europe has stuffed
herself inordinately with the gold and raw
materials of the colonial countries: Latin America,
China, and Africa . . . . Europe is literally the
creation of the Third World. The wealth which
smothers her is that which was stolen from the
underdeveloped peoples.21

The historical narrative of sugar as a sweet thing is the narrative
of slavery. 22 It is the narrative of bondage—of subjection. By
determining that entire populations—selected by darkness of skin
tone—were inferior to whiteness, whiteness was able to define itself
as superior. And when the market for sugar was created, and

18

See Lynn Stout, Address at the University of California Santa Cruz
Conference on Rethinking Capitalism: Social Risk, Human Capital, and
Financializing Inequality (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://rethinkingca
pitalism.ucsc.edu/post/category/rethinking-capitalism-conference.
19
R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW CH. 7 (1988).
20
The title for this section of the paper is inspired by the passage in
Frederick Douglass’s narrative in which he describes the violent disciplining
(i.e., bloody transaction) of his Aunt Hester by the plantation master, Colonel
Lloyd, for her indiscretion, namely being seen with another slave, a male,
named Ned Roberts. Colonel Lloyd whipped a naked Aunt Hester, yelling at
her, “D—d b—h.” FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN SLAVE 18 (1845).
21
FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 102 (Constance
Farrington trans., Grove Press 1982) (1963).
22
I use the term narrative to convey something more, perhaps beyond
mere story. It is the location of language and of experience.
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appropriated by the European upper classes, it also created complex
layers of superiority and inferiority.
The colonialism-era sugar trade further defined relations
between classes, and certainly global hierarchies, particularly in
terms of how the Global North23 (namely, Europe) saw itself against
the Global South (Latin America, Africa, India, and Middle East).
For the Global North, specifically Europe and then the United States,
Latin America became the locus for capital accumulation. 24 A
passage in Sweetness & Power where Robert Mintz quotes British
theorist John Stuart Mill powerfully clarifies the extent to which
human superiority became defined through the commodity trade,
including sugar:
There is a class of trading and exporting
communities, John Stuart Mill wrote, on which a
few words of explanation seem to be required.
23
My use of the terms Global North and Global South is informed by
the LatCrits, a group of activists and scholars that create and engage in
theory and praxis motivated by anti-subordination principles.
See
www.latcrit.org. The geographic areas that define the Global South have
historically been described, or defined, as Third World, underdeveloped,
developing nations, and in finance as “emerging markets” because instability
raises the prospect of significant returns on investment. See David M.
Trubek, From Humanitarian Assistance to Professional Education: Fifty
Years of the Wisconsin Law School’s Engagement with the Global South, 30
WIS. INT’L. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2012); See also Enrique R. Carrasco & Sean Williams,
Emerging Economies After the Global Financial Crisis: the Case of Brazil,
33 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 81 (2013). For me, these are all descriptions and
definitions that suggest inferiority. Global North and Global South are
geographic delineations, which at once reflect political and international
relations.
24
GALEANO, supra note 4, at 2, 78. Galeano also addresses “internal
colonialism,” the unequal class relations that arise within the colonialism
phenomenon. About Brazil, he writes:
In various ways the Northeast is the victim of
internal colonialism for the benefit of the industrialized
south. Within the Northeast, the sertão region is
subordinated to the sugarbelt which it supplies, and the
latifundios in their turn are subordinated to processing
plants that industrialize sugar production. The ancient
institution of the individually owned sugar estate is in
crisis: the central mills have devoured the plantations.
Id. at 63.
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These are hardly to be looked upon as countries,
carrying on an exchange of commodities with other
countries, but more properly as outlying
agricultural or manufacturing estates belonging to a
larger community. Our West Indian colonies, for
example, cannot be regarded as countries with a
productive capital of their own . . . [but are, rather]
the place where England finds it convenient to
carry on the production of sugar, coffee and a few
other tropical commodities.25
The tone and perspective of Mill’s comment indicates an
element of disdain and superiority—a sense that the countries that
become targets of English colonialism are not considered sovereigns
and are certainly not to be respected as equals. Instead, Mill seems
to indicate, they are locations for exploitation and theft. Very telling
was the fact that the local population did not benefit from the
generation of profit on the sugar plantation—a thesis that is relevant
today.26 In a discussion about his experiences in Puerto Rico—Mintz
articulates that while the natural resource was located on the island,
the end result was intended for consumption elsewhere:
Of course, the sugar was not being produced for
the Puerto Ricans themselves: they consumed only
a fraction of the finished product. Puerto Rico had
been producing sugar cane (and sugar in some
form) for four centuries, always mainly for
consumers elsewhere, whether in Seville, in
Boston, or in some other place. Had there been no
ready consumers for it elsewhere, such huge
quantities of land, labor, and capital would never
have been funneled into this one curious crop . . .27
The attitude that is reflected here is that a target be it a country,
an individual, or natural resource is necessarily reduced to whatever
use-value need be extracted from it. For example, the local
25

MINTZ, supra note 4, at 42.
See PATEL, supra note 6, at 190 (“While the refrain ‘Brazil has
become an agricultural exporting giant’ is true, the accompanying and tacit
implication, that the majority of Brazilians have benefited from this newfound global status, is false.”).
27
MINTZ, supra note 4, at xviii–xix.
26
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environment (e.g., the Amazon) is not a necessary part of our
environment to be protected; rather, it is another source from which
wealth can be extracted. People are not looked at as people (or
historically, human). People are units of labor from which profits
can be extracted, or in the case of private persons, units of profit
themselves.
The determination of who consumed and who produced was
another means in which definitions and perceptions of superiority
were enforced.28 Historically, the Global North had access to capital
and power, and the Global South had access to the natural resource
but no access to capital or power. The group with the capital was
able to exploit conditions favoring it, thus reinforcing the perception
and actuality of global hierarchy. I would argue that this same
narrative persists today notwithstanding the transition of sugar from
food to fuel, with slavery, forced labor, and bondage as the continued
methods of value creation.29
This section begins with a description of the process in which
sugar is extracted from the sugarcane plant, and then a consideration
of the impact of this process on the human body. I begin discussion
of one of the themes in this paper, that sugar very clearly organized
and defined society, and the ultimate goal of this section is to bring to
light the dichotomies, the historical relationships that defined the
sugar trade, and those that continue to create the appearance of
formal equality while at once sustaining material inequalities. Part of
the inquiry necessitates a discussion of the illusion that is the private
contract between worker and employer, 30 and the human rights
28
Id. at 42 (“The wealth they created mostly returned to Britain; the
products they made were consumed in Britain; and the products made by
Britons—cloth, tools, torture instruments—were consumed by slaves who
were themselves consumed in the creation of wealth.” (emphasis added)).
29
See discussion infra Part I.C. Slavery, or forced labor as some prefer
to call it, as a business model is documented just about everywhere except
for corporate disclosure documents.
30
While there is equality, in that both worker and employer have the
right to enter into a business relationship or not, the circumstances in which
that decision is made is not one of equality, which leads to inequality. See
Darder, supra note 10, at 852 (“[W]e must cultivate a critical understanding
of how the politics of globalization have functioned to perpetuate increasing
material inequality and human suffering, in the name of economic
development, democracy and social progress.”). If as former Brazil
President Lula puts it, “Those who do not cut sugarcane go hungry,” then
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violations that seem integral to sugar production and indicate the
profitability of the slave plantation as an economic model.31
A. THE EUROPEAN SUGAR PLANTATION
It takes extraordinary human effort to cut sugarcane, and as
discussed later in this article, an enormous amount of capital. The
work is so violent on the human body that the idea of the zombie
grew out of the physical and mental effort needed to cut and process
sugarcane in Haiti. The zombie, a body that moves absent
consciousness, is described in Sweet Negotiations:
It is not surprising that the folklore figure of the
zombie emerged from sugar plantations. Slaves
faced not only the danger of scalding but also that
of getting their fingers caught in the mill’s rollers.
Since the arm was invariably drawn in . . . ‘if a mill
feeder be catch’t by the finger, his whole body
drawn in, and he is squeez’d to pieces.’ . . . Since
formal equality is a mere illusion and reinforced by a structure which denies
that opportunity. See JEFFREY REIMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, THE RICH GET
RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 70 (9th ed. 2010).
31
See Clemens Höges, A ‘Green Tsunami’ in Brazil: The High Price of
Clean, Cheap Ethanol, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Jan. 22, 2009, 6:38 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,602951,00.html
(“The
ancestors of Brazil's big landowners established the first plantations shortly
after Christopher Columbus brought sugarcane to the New World. First they
drove Indians into their fields, then they shipped in blacks from Africa. The
nightmare of trans-Atlantic slavery began with sugarcane. Now the crop
gives up ethanol as well as sugar, and a green tsunami is rolling across
Brazil.”(emphasis added)); see also MINTZ, supra note 4, at xxiv (noting that
island plantations were the invention of Europe); id. at 47–52 (describing the
dangerous work involved with boiling the cane); PATEL supra note 6, at 78
(“To grow tea and sugar required industrial agriculture’s single most bloody
innovation—the plantation. The agricultural technology of advanced and
permanent monoculture came bundled with its own social technology, of soil
tilled, cane hacked and leaves plucked by an endless supply of almost
disposable people from the Global South.”); Russell R. Menard, Plantation
Empire: How Sugar and Tobacco Planters Built Their Industries and Raised
an Empire, 81 AGRIC. HIST., Summer 2007, at 309, 309 (discussing the
financial gains made in English commerce due to the plantation model).
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the harvest season could last ten months, during
which the mill ran constantly, shutting down only
to clean or repair the machinery when rain
prevented harvesting cane or on Sundays, the
slaves were almost always exhausted. They are
often described as sleeping on their feet, while in
Brazil ‘sleepy like a sugar mill slave’ was a
common expression.32
The zombie represents a non-human condition; in essence a
subaltern 33 black or brown body occupied by the European
conception of (1) humanity, (2) property, and (3) ownership and
power. 34 Through the space that is the slaves’ bodies, an entire
economic theory sustained trade, and the sugar trade in particular
depended precisely on an economic theory or model in which human
beings could be bought, sold, traded, and disposed of in a wage
market that devalued the wage itself.35

32

RUSSELL R. MENARD, SWEET NEGOTIATIONS 15 (2006).
Gayatri Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds.,
1988) (explaining that the subaltern is the person without a voice—the
person living on the margins of society).
34
In essence, this paper is about power and the social, economic, and
political structures that replicate power. While I do not cite particular
passages, I am greatly influenced by the readings of Michel Foucault,
Antonio Gramsci, and Jean-Paul Sartre. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY VOL. I–III (Robert Hurley trans., 1990); ANTONIO GRAMSCI,
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Quentin Hoare & Geoffrey
Nowell Smith eds., 1971); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ANTI-SEMITE AND JEW: AN
EXPLORATION OF THE ETIOLOGY OF HATE (George J. Becker trans., 1948).
35
I discuss the wage market issue in Part III of this paper. In this part,
I use the term “disposable people.” I thought I was clever in coming up with
the idea; however, in the course of my research I determined that this idea is
in no way novel. That said, I was delighted to realize that I am not alone in
my assessment. See KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2012). During the colonial and plantation era,
slaves were considered the private property of plantation owners. Today,
Bales and others define a new condition of the modern slave: the condition
of commodity. The modern slave as commodity is cheaper and more
profitable to the process than the slave as property was to the slave owner.
Id. at 14–15. There is no need to invest capital to maintain the slave as
property because the slave can easily be replaced. There is no need for longterm maintenance and care of “property” and certainly no need for the
33
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While what defines slavery or slave labor may have evolved,36
there is a truth that remains today: The narrative of sugar as fuel
continues the narrative of bondage, a reality that is well
documented.37 The individual (typically a male because women are
deemed to produce lower output per day) that is caught in the
predicament of bondage or slave labor is one that is poor and with
very few socio-economic options. In other words, the individual is a
member of what Lucy Parsons calls the “property-less class.” 38
Without a legacy of privilege or property, this individual has only
manual labor to sell.39

expense of documents protecting legal ownership. As Bales notes, a shortterm relationship, low-cost purchase, and absence of legal ownership results
in higher profits for the modern “slave-holder” than for the historical slaveowner or trader. Id. at 4, 14–15.
36
See Lukas Knott, Unocal Revisited: On the Difference Between
Slavery and Forced Labor in International Law, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 201
(2010–2011); see also Justin Campbell, A Growing Concern: Modern
Slavery and Agricultural Production in Brazil and South Asia, HUM. RTS. &
WELFARE,
2008,
at
131,
131–41,
available
at
HUM.
http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/slavery/agriculture.pdf; SOFIA
MONSALVE SUÁREZ ET AL., FIAN INT’L, AGROFUELS IN BRAZIL: REPORT OF
THE FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES
ENCOURAGING THE PRODUCTION OF AGROFUELS ON THE ENJOYMENT OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS TO FOOD, WORK AND THE ENVIRONMENT AMONG THE
PEASANT AND INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES AND RURAL WORKERS IN BRAZIL
(2008),
available
at
http://www.fian.org/resources/doc
uments/others/agrofuels-in-brazil.
37
See MONSALVE SUAREZ ET AL., supra note 36; see also Campbell,
supra note 36; Forced Labour in Brazil: 120 years after the Abolition of
Slavery, the Fight goes on, ILO (May 13, 2008), http://www.ilo.org/g
lobal/about-the-ilo/press-and-media.centre/insight/WCMS_092663 /lang-en/index.htm, [hereinafter ILO]; PATEL, supra note 6, at 192 (citing ILO).
38
In many respects, Lucy Eldine Gonzalez Parson’s “property-less
class” is indeed the “disposable class.” See T.S. GREER & LUCY PARSONS, A
LIFELONG ANARCHIST! SELECTED WORDS AND WRITINGS OF LUCY PARSONS
545–46 (2010) (explaining that the property-less class—the wage workers—
are by competition forced to sell their labor—themselves—to the lowest
bidder or starve).
39
For example, Ruben Ometto Silveira Mello, the individual that
controls Cosan S.A. and Cosan Ltd., would never imagine a life of cane
cutting. Ometto Siveira Mello is named No. 554 in Forbes billionaires list
worldwide. In Brazil he is No. 19. See The World’s Billionaires, FORBES
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B. CANE CUTTING AND PROCESSING TODAY
If manual labor is to be used, sugarcane fields are first set on
fire for the purpose of removing the leaves on the stalk and killing
any pests or creatures that could harm the workers.40 The stalks are
quite tall, anywhere between four and twelve feet high, and to cut
through the tough exterior of the plant (even without the leaves)
requires the use of a machete (in Spanish) or facão (in Portuguese), a
large blade anywhere from one to two feet in length. Maria
Aparecida de Moraes Silva, a professor of sociology at Universidade
Estadual Paulista describes the work:
The act of cutting the cane consists of two strokes
with the facão. The first stroke separates the cane
from the root, and the second removes the
remaining leaves from the stalk, allowing the
worker to twist the stalk free with his hand. The
motions are fast and fluid, but the double stroke
requires strength, even the first, second, or third
time.41

MAGAZINE,
http://www.forbes.com/profile/rubens-ometto-silveira-mello/
(last updated Mar. 2013).
40
Höges, supra note 31, at 1; see also BANCO NACIOINAL DE
DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONOMICO E SOCIAL & CENTRO DE GESTAO E ESTUDOS
ESTRATEGICOS, SUGARCANE-BASED BIOETHANOL: ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 72 (1st ed. 2008) [hereinafter BNDES], available at
http://www.bioetanoldecana.org; Roberto Sementazo et al., A Discrete Event
of Sugar Cane Harvesting Operations, 46 J. OPERATIONAL RES. SOC’Y 1073,
1073 (Sept. 1995) (discussing problem that arises if too much time lapses—
fifteen days—between cane burn and processing).
41
Rel UITA, Disposable Workers: The Ethanol of Flesh and Bones,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jR Xxjz1B
UsY&feature=related; see also Cristine Pires, Ethanol is a Potential New
Ally against Modern Slavery in Brazil: Demand for Biofuel may Improve
Working Conditions in Sugarcane Fields, INFOSURHOY.COM (Feb. 7, 2010),
http://infosurhoy.com/cocoon/saii/xhtml/en_GB/featur
es/saii/features/main/2010/07/02/feature-04. The title of this article is
misleading because what is documented in the article is the condition of the
sugarcane worker. In the article, Profesora Aparecida de Moraes says that
“workers usually are registered, have work permits, work contract
agreements and get paid based on their productivity. . . . But if we look
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One day’s work in the fields equates to swinging the machete
anywhere from 3000 to 4000 times and stopping to resharpen the
blade about three times. 42 According to Professor Aparecida de
Moraes, the current demand for sugar translates into increased
productivity requirements: While in the 1980s, the workers were
expected to cut five to eight tons of cane per day, today the
expectation is over ten tons.43
After the cane is cut, it is transferred to the sugar mill by truck
where it is then crushed by rollers as part of the process to extract its
juice. 44 If the cane is not washed, the juice released from the
crushing process will be dirty with soil. The crushing is intended to
separate the plant fibers and waste, or bagasse, from juice. The
bagasse is used to power the mill, which reduces the energy
necessary to run the plant.45 Water from the juice is then evaporated
causing a kind of crystallized cake or a honey-like soft and brown
residue called molasses. The sugar we use to sweeten our coffee
comes from the crystalized cake. Sugar ethanol is derived from the

closely into this work relationship issue, we see that freedom is nonexistent.”
Id. (emphasis added).
42
Rel UITA, supra note 41; see also Höges, supra note 31.
43
Höges, supra note 31, at 1 (describing experience of a typical worker
in which the worker is required to harvest three and a half tons of sugarcane,
which makes about 300 liters of fuel).
44
BNDES, supra note 40, at 72 (discussing transportation to avoid
saccharose loss); see also Sementazo et al., supra note 40.
45
BNDES, supra note 40, at 72. The market has indicated that
producing biofuels from sugar is done at a lower cost basis than corn ethanol
and others and through a more efficient process:
Demand for ethanol derived from sugarcane is high
because the process is more cost-effective and efficient
and produces less greenhouse gas emissions than the
process involving corn. Ethanol, whether sugar- or cornderived, is purportedly a rich source of heat and energy.
Ethanol can also be added to gasoline in a way that
improves the efficiency of the fuel.
Id. at 65–66. Furthermore, of all biofuels, including corn ethanol, sugar
ethanol purportedly has the highest rating in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. But see David Morris, Give Ethanol a Chance: The Case for
Corn-Based Fuel, ALTERNET (June 13, 2007), http://www.alternet.org
/story/53956/give_ethanol_a_chance%3A_the_case_for_corn-based_fuel
(advocating for the use of biofuels and corn ethanol in particular).
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molasses, which is sent to a distillery where it is converted into
alcohol.
The work is still dangerous and there are many short-term and
long-term injuries. Workers are exposed to chemicals from the
burning of the cane, which trigger long-term diseases including
cancer, degenerative diseases, and chronic renal failure. 46 The
working lifespan of a cane cutter is about fifteen years. 47 They leave
or are fired because they are unable to physically do the work. And
are left with nothing. Thus, they do not leave after fifteen years to
“retire”; rather, they leave because they are injured, mutilated,
diseased, and no longer viable sources of labor.48
In other words, there is a point in which all human energy has
been extracted, and when there is nothing left, the laborer is of no use
to the mill operator. For me, this translates into the commodification
of human labor, which essentially means such labor is easily
disposed of and replaced. In other words, the property owner is in
the position to exploit the productive capital—whether human or
natural resource—and extract value from labor in a way that the
worker is unable to. The worker in many respects is equal to the
sugarcane. Once the labor value is extracted (as the juice in the cane),
what is left is waste, and like the bagasse, a worker that is useless. In
many respects, this is why modern slavery is much more profitable
than colonialism-era slavery, when slaves were themselves
investments that had to be maintained. 49 While the life and work
span of a slave was short, there were costs associated with slaves as
property in the same way that equipment required capital
maintenance. The modern laborer, as a result of perceived freedoms,
namely the freedom of contract, imposes no such cost on the property
owner.
C. IS FORCED LABOR SLAVERY?

46

See Rel UITA, supra note 41; see also Juan F. Perea, The Echoes of
Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the Agricultural and Domestic
Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO STATE L.J.
95, 97 (2011).
47
Rel UITA, supra note 41.
48
Id.; see also MONSALVE SUAREZ ET AL., supra note 36 at 4.
49
See BALES, supra note 35, at 15. See generally id. ch. 1.
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While condemned or abolished in the United States in 1876 and
in Brazil in 1888 (albeit without a divisive civil war),50 slavery exists
today, and this phenomenon is recognized internationally. 51 The

50

BALES, supra note 35, at 123.
See Campbell, supra note 36; see also Samantha Pearson, Banco do
Brasil sued over ‘slavery’ funding, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, 7:13 A.M.,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bf81a228-5c1f-11e0-8f4800144feab49a.html#axzz1yqCEsYs8; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD
REPORT 2012, at 221 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/si
tes/default/files/related_material/brazil_2012.pdf (“In May 2011 the UN
special rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery encouraged Brazil to
strengthen efforts to close loopholes perpetuating the practice of slavery,
including forced labor in the country's rural areas.”); Helena de Moura,
Brazilian Officials Rescue Workers in Slave-like Conditions, CNN ( Sept. 11,
2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-11/world/brazil.slavery_1_rescueslave-brazilian-officials?_s=PM:WORLD (describing condition of ninetyfive rescued sugarcane workers in Rio de Janeiro, who were essentially
denied basic sanitation, water and dangerous modes of transportation);
Michael Smith & David Voreacos, The Secret World of Modern Slavery,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2006), http://www.bloomberg.com /apps/news?p
id=newsarchive&sid=aul9sXScm.QE#share; Katie Fehrenbacher, Brenco’s
Big Uh-Oh: Ethanol Workers’ ‘Terrible’ Conditions, GIGAOM (Apr. 1, 2008),
http://gigaom.com/cleantech/brencos-big-uh-oh-ethanol-workers-terribleconditions/; Tom Philpott, Amnesty International: forced labor in Brazil’s
sugarcane fields, GRIST (May 31, 2008), http://grist.org/article/slave-ethanol/;
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR’S BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFF., OFFICE OF CHILD
LABOR, FORCED LABOR, & HUMAN TRAFFICKING, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR’S
LIST OF GOODS PRODUCED BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR 10 (2010),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/pdf/2010TVPRA.pdf;
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR’S BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR’S 2010 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR 103 (2011),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf;
Shell Makes Deal with Cosan in Brazil Despite Slave Labour Claims, ANTI(Mar.
2010),
http://www.antislavery.org/english/press_a
SLAVERY
nd_news/news_and_press_releases_2008/2010_press_and_news/030210_she
ll_makes_deal_with_cosan_despite_slave_labour_claims.aspx (Cosan SA
Industria and Comercio, a subsidiary of Cosan Limited, were added to the
Brazil Labor Ministry black list of companies whose workers persist in
slave-like conditions). But see Lucia Kassai & Katia Cortes, Cosan Jumps
After Minister says Blacklist was Mistake (Update 3), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8,
2010, 11:30 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps /news?pid=
newsarchive&sid =aVr5PNqZMeOQ.
51
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condition is a real one, particularly in the area of agriculture and in
emerging economies.52
Some take issue with the term slavery as used to describe what is
forced labor or what is known as debt bondage53—common in human
trafficking—and argue or propose that the term is inappropriate to
describe these arrangements. 54 In part, I agree that the terms
52

See Perea, supra note 46, at 97 (“Contemporary farm workers endure
substandard wages, often brutal working conditions, no health insurance or
other employee benefits, horrifying living conditions, and environmental
hazards.”); see also Nancy Ehrenreich & Beth Lyon, The Global Politics of
Food: A Critical Overview, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 17 (2009) (“In
short, rural poor communities and farm workers bear the brunt of their
nations' inability to control the economic impacts of corporate agriculture,
and women and children bear a disproportionate share of that burden.”).
53
See FREE THE SLAVES AND HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, UNIV. OF CA.,
BERKELEY, HIDDEN SLAVES: FORCED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (2004),
available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/forcedlabor/8 (“When
depressed wages, poor working conditions, and a lack of legal protections
are combined with an increasing demand for cheap farm labor, the result is a
continuum of abuses of which forced labor is the most extreme.”); id. at 16,
n. 24 (“In this context we are referring to abuses other than those detrimental
to workers’ health, including death and debilitating injuries or sickness that
can be caused by the dangerous working conditions.”); see also MONSALVE
SUAREZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 18 (“Slave labor is one of the most brutal
forms of oppression to which a significant part of the Brazilian rural
population is subjected.”); Campbell, supra note 36; ILO, supra note 37, at 1
(estimating that from 25,000 to 40,000 Brazilians are subject to debtbondage); Barbara L. Bernier, Sugar Cane Slavery: Bateyes in the
Dominican Republic, 9 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 17 (2003).
54
See Knott, supra note 36. Knott argues that the terms slavery and
forced labor have different legal meanings and therefore takes issue with the
interchangeable usage of each in describing forms of involuntary labor. For
Knott, the legal effect of equating the two practices is that both receive jus
cogens treatment under international law. Id. at 209.
“In approximate terms, slavery can simply be defined as
the most extreme form of bondage, as opposed to
freedom. The problem is in determining where it really
exists, and when it starts. It is necessary to distinguish it
from other forms of forced labor, as compulsion is part
of any private relationship, and even more so of
relationships between individuals and the state.”
Id. I would argue that Knott presents a compelling examination of the
dilemma; however, he fails to recognize and account for the cultures and
systems of coercion; see infra Part I.D.
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represent different economic arrangements or conditions. One could
argue that the forced labor experience is distinct from slavery,
particularly if one has in mind the violent representation of American
slavery. 55 American slavery, and the North American slave trade,
were characterized by the following: (1) bodies legally quantified as
less than a legal person; 56 (2) slaves recorded as property (chattel
being the common term); (3) lack of freedom in every respect of life
(hence the whips and chains); and (4) violence and rape taken as the
norm. 57 Therefore, if we define slavery as fitting this specific
paradigm, then forced labor is difficult to rationalize as such. Those
that argue there is a difference point to the detail that in forced labor,
the worker is not legal property of the owner and has a degree of
autonomy; however, others and I argue that what is disregarded is a
nefarious element of control and dehumanization.58 As described by
those that have researched the field, forced labor is hidden from
everyday sight, and in many instances there are no visible chains, no
clear indication of exploitation. 59 And when gazing across a field,
the activity being performed, whether by adults or children, looks

55
See also SHARPE, supra note 3, at 4 (“My intent is to examine and
account for a series of repetitions of master narratives of violence and forced
submission that are read or reinscribed as consent and affection: intimacies
that involve shame and trauma and their transgenerational transmission.”).
See generally DOUGLASS, supra note 20; HARTMAN, supra note 3, at 22
(“The scenes of subjection considered here—the coerced spectacles
orchestrated to encourage the trade in black flesh; scenes of torture and
festivity; the tragedy of virtuous women and the antics of outrageous
darkies—all turn upon the simulation of agency and the excesses of black
enjoyment.”).
56
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
2(“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”
(emphasis added)).
57
See DOUGLASS, supra note 20.
58
See BALES, supra note 35, at 14–19; UNIV. OF CA., supra note 53, at
1–2.
59
See Ormond, supra note 1, at 1; UNIV. OF CA., supra note 53, at 5
(describing human trafficking in the United States as “hidden from view”).
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“normal.”60 In other words, depicted in that view there is no obvious
violence.61
But as Professor Mintz describes in his recollection of a visit to
the cane fields of Puerto Rico, only the whip is missing.62 There is
lack of choice.63 There is fear. There is pain. There is violence.
And all of it is invisible.64 The argument that what is happening is
not slavery is based on the romantic idea that the arrangement
between laborer and manager or owner is one of private contract and
consent—the precise dynamic I examine next.
D. THE ILLUSORY PRIVATE CONTRACT

60
Julia Ormond’s lecture at the Oslo Freedom Forum provocatively
recounts a scene of what appears to be healthy children fishing. She says
that she is told this is child slavery. She expects the boys to be emaciated.
Her NGO guide tells her yes, but the child is twelve years old. That his body
is that of a man tells the NGO that the boy has been doing five years of hard
labor. Ormond, supra note 1, at 1; see also UNIV. OF CA., supra note 53.
61
See Ormond, supra note 1, at 1.
62
MINTZ, supra note 4. From the introduction of Sweetness and Power,
Mintz’s description of cane work while he was in Puerto Rico:
All the time I was in Barrio Jauca, I felt as if we were on
an island, floating in a sea of cane. . . . I would
sometimes stand by the line of cutters who were working
in intense heat and under great pressure, while the
foreman stood (and the mayordomo rode) at their backs.
If one had read about the history of Puerto Rico and of
sugar, then the lowing of the animals, the shouts of the
mayordomo, the grunting of the men as they swung their
machetes, the sweat and dust and din easily conjured up
an earlier island era. Only the sound of the whip was
missing.
Id. at xviii (emphasis added).
63
See infra note 65 (describing the gato).
64
See Perea, supra note 46, at 98 (“Modern-day slavery cases don't
happen in a vacuum. They only occur in degraded labor environments, ones
that are fundamentally, systematically exploitive. In industries where the
labor force is conti[n]gent, day-haul, with subpoverty wages, no benefits, no
right to overtime, no right to organize—that's where you see slavery taking
root.”); see also Ormond, supra note 1, at 1 (describing how slavery is
hidden).
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The theory of private contract suggests that a worker has
bargained his or her labor in exchange for value, either a wage,
something in-kind, or both, for example room and board or health
care. The benefit of such private contract is the ability to sue for
breach of contract and potentially recover damages. In the case of a
good number of sugarcane cutters, however, the private contract
appears wholly illusory. 65 While without question a private
relationship exists, I find that there is no true enforceable contract

65

The process by which debt-bondage comes about has been described
as one in which a private contract is formed between a hired contractor and
workers. However, the bargaining of such contract is flawed and unequal as
there is great misrepresentation in the remuneration to be received as well as
the location and accommodations. There is a consistent description of how
the relationship arises in agricultural work in Brazil, both sugar and soy,
which many describe as debt-bondage:
Enslavement typically begins with a hired contractor
known as a gato, who recruits impoverished men from
the slums of large cities or poor, rural villages. By
offering cash up front and the promise of decent wages,
he is able to entice these men to leave their homes for
work on a distant estate. The men are then driven
hundreds or thousands of miles to a remote ranch or
plantation, where they are informed that they are in debt
for the costs of transportation, food provided on the trip,
and even tools.
Campbell, supra note 36, at 131; see also BALES, supra note 35, at 126
(describing the role of the gato in recruiting in the slums for charcoal camps).
A 2008 article by the ILO recounts the experience of Natanael with this
process. Natanael was ultimately never paid:
‘The problems started right away. It took us three days
to get to the estate, which was located one-hundred
kilometres from the nearest town. We had very little to
eat and had to sleep on the highway’, recalls Natanael.
As soon as he and the others arrived, the employers
collected their employment cards (a document which
every worker in Brazil has to present when joining a new
job) and stamped ‘cancelled’ on them. Natanael was put
to work clearing fields with a chainsaw and without any
kind of protective gear. When he asked about his pay, he
was told ‘later.’
ILO, supra note 37, at 1.
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here. What remedy is there, for example, when the employer fails to
pay the wage or follow through on promises?66
The presence of coercion, supported by harsh and inhumane
economic conditions, impacts the efficacy of choice and of the socalled contractual relationship. 67 As Julia Ormond indicated, that
slavery does not look like slavery, the coercion that is present in the
relationships is not necessarily that of a surly, boss-type intimidating
those that sign up to work on the field.68 The coercion that I am
interested in, and that theorists write about, is structural coercion
(which has been recognized in U.S. corporations’ law as a valid
predicament) 69 that would naturally exist in relations between the
66
See ILO, supra note 37, at 1 (finding that in 2008, an estimated
“25,000 to 40,000 workers are still victims of conditions analogous to
slavery in this South American Country.” The report emphasizes the place
that poverty and rural geography has in perpetuating the condition, and it
tells the story of a 21-year-old male worker from northern Brazil after
responding to a radio advertisement offering work.); see also BALES, supra
note 35, at 126–27 (speaking of similar patterns, albeit in the Brazil charcoal
camps).
67
I define coercion legally, as the structural inequity in bargaining
power of the participants to the private contract. See REIMAN & LEIGHTON,
supra note 30, at 221-22 (engaging a discussion on the nature of coercion (as
interpreted by Marx) as arising from the structure of the laborer’s
relationship to the “capitalist” and to property).
68
See Campbell, supra note 36, at 131.
69
Corporations’ law, specifically out of the Delaware Chancery and
Supreme Courts, recognizes the idea of structural coercion. In 1985, the
Delaware Court of Chancery began to review litigation involving the hostile
takeover of corporations. A takeover would be deemed hostile because the
buyer circumvented the board of directors, refusing to deal with it, and went
directly to the shareholders with a direct offer to buy their shares (known as a
tender offer). Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. Ch.
1985) (determining that the two-tier offer by Mesa Corporation for the shares
held by Unocal shareholders was structurally coercive because the choice to
tender was based on the potential for disparate treatment and not an objective
determination of value—the disparate treatment being that those that did not
tender their shares in the first tier would be subject to questionable value in
the second tier; thus, a tender offer that is structurally coercive creates the
illusion or appearance of a voluntary tender, while in actuality the
shareholder tenders up front to avoid the certainty of significant value
attrition at the back end); see also Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance
to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. Law. 247, 267 (1989) (noting that
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property-owning and the property-less. 70 The bargaining between
these two parties is illusory, as the worker has no bargaining power
when it comes to demanding a fair wage, or even better, a wage
equivalent to the value of the product that was transformed by his
labor. True bargaining is impossible with the commodification
(disposable nature) of the laborer—there are plenty of others that will
take his place. Therefore, the worker also has no meaningful work
alternative, as the only other option is unemployment.71 In addition,
after the contract is formed there is further coercion as Lucy Parsons
further explains: “[i]t compels the wage-worker, under a penalty of
hunger, misery and distress of wife and children to obey the dictation
of the employer.” 72 In other words, once you are within the
employer’s domain, the laborer loses any semblance of control of his
circumstances.
At the international level, the relationship of power is replicated
in part by the structural inequality between Brazil and foreign capital.
The lack of meaningful alternatives—in essence the lack of true
choice—creates the cruel paradox in the sugar ethanol trade: without
foreign investment, Brazil as an emerging economy stagnates, thus
diminishing the opportunity for the working class to work. However,
it is precisely foreign investment that recreates structures of
exploitation, inequality, and dependency. This dependency on
structural coercion arises from “risk that disparate treatment of non-tendering
shareholders’ might distort shareholders’ tender decision”).
70
See also GREER & PARSONS, supra note 38, at 545–46 (explaining
that coercion was strictly structural, that is arising from the nature of
capitalism’s economic relationships. “They demonstrate the economic law
of competition, which is the rule of the cheapest. The property-less class—
the wage workers are by competition forced to sell their labor—
themselves—to the lowest bidder or starve.”); see also REIMAN & LEIGHTON,
supra note 30, at 222 (“The very existence of the social roles of capitalist
and worker—defined by ownership and non-ownership of means of
production, respectively—is what coerces the worker to work without
compensation. It coerces in the same way that a social structure that allotted
to one group ownership and thus control of all the available oxygen would
coerce. . . . No additional force would be necessary for the coercion to
operate.”).
71
GREER &PARSONS, supra note 38, at 545–46 (“The property-less
class—the wage workers-are by competition forced to sell their labor—
themselves—to the lowest bidder or starve.”).
72
Id. at 591–93.


310

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 9.2

foreign capital is very much like the relationship of the colonizer and
the colonized.73 In the next section, I consider the ways that foreign
capital finances the sugar ethanol industry and the ways in which
Brazil regulates, or fails to regulate, its capital market. Brazil
effectively regulates landownership when it would be well-advised to
regulate the mechanisms through which foreign capital insinuates
itself into this industry.

II. BRAZIL SUGAR MARKET: THE BUSINESS AND LEGAL
CONTEXT
And [Sir Dalby Thomas governor of Jamaica]
saw that because the whole process—from the
establishment of colonies, the seizure of slaves, the
amassing of capital, the protection of shipping, and
all else to actual consumption—took shape under
the wing of the state, such undertakings were at
every point as meaningful politically as they were
economically.74
The dictatorship hawked the country to foreign
capitalists as a pimp offers a woman, and put the
stress where it belonged . . .75
The colonialism–era sugar trade was sustained by a legal and
business environment that permitted free trade via the exploitation of
national resources abroad and the dehumanization and
73
See Rachel J. Anderson, Toward Global Corporate Citizenship:
Reframing Foreign Direct Investment Law, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1, 5
(2009–2010) (describing foreign direct investment law as “a vestige of the
colonial era during which early forms of transnational corporations
emerged”); GALEANO, supra note 4, at 206–07; see also FRANTZ FANON,
BLACK SKIN WHITE MASKS, ch. IV (Charles Lam Markmann trans., Grove
Press 1967) (1952) [hereinafter FANON, BLACK SKIN WHITE MASKS]
(describing an inferiority of the colonized (black) that becomes so deeply
engrained—inferiority that includes recognition of the superiority of the
colonizer (white), such that the colonized wants and needs to become like the
colonizer to feel of value as a human. Furthermore, the brilliance of this
psychological phenomenon is that it creates a self-abnegation that
perpetuates a desired power-structure).
74
MINTZ, supra note 4, at 41.
75
GALEANO, supra note 4, at 217.
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reclassification of humans as legal property for purposes of
facilitating that trade. In this section, I consider a selection of laws
that impact land control, corporate transactions, labor, and the
environment in Brazil—laws that keep open the door to foreign
capital.
A. ONE OF THE BRICS
Brazil is one of the BRIC countries.76 The significance of this
grouping is that it represents to the capital markets a significant
potential for risk-based returns. BRIC countries are considered
“emerging markets,” essentially up-and-coming markets where
opportunistic investors can make significant returns on investment.77
The energy sector has a particular interest in Brazil as it discovers
returns to be made by alternative fuels. And Brazil is desirable
because it has a powerful asset—one of the largest concentrations of
what is called biomass. 78 What makes an emerging market

76
The BRIC countries are Brazil, Russia, India, and China. From an
economist’s point of view, the BRICS represent certain GDP levels that
while below the G8, are compelling, infrastructure and stability in trade. See
generally Building BRICS, FT.COM, http://www.ft.com/intl/indepth/bric (last
visited Apr. 1, 2013) (focusing on emerging market news for the BRIC
countries, Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Sometimes South Africa is
thrown in as the “S” in BRICS. See J.P.P., Why is South Africa included in
the BRICS, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 29, 2013, 5:35 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/03/econ omistexplains-why-south-africa-brics; Carrasco & Williams, supra note 23, at 4.
77
See also supra note 23(describing Global South as emerging market).
78
See Jim Chen, Biodiversity and Biotechnology: A Misunderstood
Relation, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 51, 51 (2005) (“The global south is home
to most of earth's threatened and endangered species, while the global north
holds the capital and technology needed to develop this natural wealth.”).
Biomass is “living (or once living) stuff” like trees, bushes, grasses, algae,
grains, microbes, bacteria, the oceans, and life in the oceans. BRONSON ET
AL., supra note 10, at 56, 60–61 (2011) (listing all companies, energy and
agribusiness, involved with investment presence in the biofuel market); see
also Marcos Sawaya Jank, From the President’s Desk: Ethanol at the
Crossroads, UNICA SUGAR CANE ASSOCIATION (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://english.unica.com.br/opinioao/show.as/?msgCode.
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attractive? There is risk here—risk from instability and risk with
significant payoffs.79
Brazil has had an ethanol market since the 1970s when policy
dictated the need to move toward alternative fuels to satisfy domestic
demand for energy. 80 However, notwithstanding this demand, the
government81 and certainly local business interests have been unable
to develop and independently exploit and expand the ethanol market.
As a result, offshore investors have identified Brazil as an
opportunity in the energy sector, 82 and significant foreign capital has
entered the fray.83

79
See supra note 10 (discussing the multiple avenues for profitability
in biomass).
80
See Vanessa M. Cordonnier, Ethanol’s Roots: How Brazilian
Legislation Created the International Ethanol Boom, 33 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 287, 294 (2008) (citing twenty federal directives in
the sugarcane market since 1941, including Programa Nacional do Alcool,
Decree 76.593 of Nov. 14, 1975, which gave ethanol a role in Brazil’s fuel
economy).
81
The role of the sovereign in shaping the economy and influencing the
capital markets is evident not just from policy (setting quotas for sugar
production), but also from participations in investments. For example, the
government controls the energy business in Brazil. Thus, notwithstanding
Petrobras’s public financing via IPO, see infra note 98 and accompanying
text, those that purchased interests in the company were subject to the Brazil
sovereign as controlling shareholder. See generally PETROBRAS ENERGIA
S.A., SEC PROSPECTUS (Dec. 11, 2009) [hereinafter PETROBRAS PROSPECTUS],
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1449877/ 0000950123
08017747/y72519b3e424b3.htm.
82
In fact, Brazil’s economic policy includes permitting foreign
interests to dominate its economy. See Celio Hiratuka, Foreign Direct
Investment and Transnational Corporations in Brazil: Recent Trends and
Impacts on Economic Development 2 (Working Grp. on Dev. & Env’t in the
Ams., Discussion Paper No. 10, Apr. 2008)
(“One of the basic
characteristics of the Brazilian economy is a high level of
internationalization, with foreign corporations playing a leading role in many
sectors.”).
83
Notwithstanding the government’s control of Petrobras, sugar
production in Brazil is reliant on the participation of foreign capital. See also
Hiratuka, supra note 82, at 4 (discussing the historically important and
significant role of foreign capital in the Brazil economy); Anderson, supra
note 73. See generally PETROBRAS ENERGIA S.A., SEC PROSPECTUS
SUPPLEMENT (Sept. 3, 2010) [hereinafter PETROBRAS PROSPECTUS
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While the intent of this section is to examine the business and
legal context in which the sugar ethanol market is evolving in Brazil,
there is an important subject concerning the separation of ownership
from control as concerns natural resources and certainly labor. Thus,
I am compelled in this section to examine how the private market is
controlled and how the business and legal or regulatory context
facilitates (and indeed encourages) that control. I would like to
clarify that when I say legal or regulatory, I am interested in actual
regulations—environmental and corporate—that are in place as well
as the way in which law reinforces and reproduces power.84 Thus, in
the same manner that the plantation economy extracted value from
slave labor and natural resources, transferring wealth across the
ocean, the new sugar boom exploits Brazil’s labor and environment
with no meaningful transfer of wealth to the local communities.
B. FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTMENT
I begin with who supplies the capital.85 The historical process of
converting sugarcane into sugar was, and still is, a capital-intensive
process because a significant capital contribution is required up front
and continuously to maintain operations. For the seventeenth and
eighteenth century investors, capital-intensiveness meant costs
associated with acquiring land, acquiring and maintaining equipment
and machinery, and certainly the acquisition of labor. Slave labor
was preferred because it was permitted by law and ensured the
greatest returns on investment.
It is important to note that during the colonialism–era sugar
market, foreign capital was not necessarily investing in a local
SUPPLEMENT], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1
119639 /000095012310083653/y86399e424b2.htm
84
Roger Cotterrell, Making Law Central: A View of Sociological
Studies, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 632, 639 (2002) (suggesting that the law is the
infrastructure of social relations). In the case of biofuels, I extend Professor
Cotterrell’s argument that laws and regulations are “redefined as an engine[s]
for profit.” Id. at 644.
85
MENARD, supra note 32, at 50-51 (discussing the role the Dutch had
in developing the sugar market in Barbados). The title of this section,
“Foreign Capital Investment,” is influenced by Menard’s discussion of the
enormous costs that Bajans faced in the Barbadian sugar boom, and the
corresponding question: who supplied the capital?
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business activity. More often than not, foreign capital arrived in
various parts of the Global South to create a market in which
commodities belonging to another were exploited. 86 Lending was
structured as simple secured debt credit arrangements with the
product or equipment as collateral. 87 Financing also came from
“funds transferred to the colonies by immigrants who used
inheritances or proceeds from the sale of property at home to make a
start in America,” 88 but it is unclear about how profits were
distributed. Presumably the distributions followed the typical
priority of payments in which debt participations were paid first,
followed by equity participations.89
Menard describes the predicament of Barbados, in which local
capital was sparse given the lack of local wealth:
I suspect that Barbados would have become a
major sugar producer with or without the
contribution of the London merchants, but if
islanders had to rely on savings out of current
earnings alone, it would have been a much slower
process, and there would be no talk of sugar
revolution or even a sugar boom. While the
intervention of merchants was not necessary to the
rise of Barbadian sugar industry, it did speed it up
and give it the special intensity that set it apart and
made it possible to speak of the sugar revolution or
86
While Professor Menard focuses on Barbados, the financing of sugar
trade was very similar throughout the Caribbean and the Global South.
European financing either created a market in sugar where one really did not
exist, or as in Barbados, fully developed a weak one. See MENARD, supra
note 32, at 50 (“[O]ne finds evidence of capital coming from a variety of
sources, but it is usually argued that the island’s development in the early
stages of the sugar boom was especially dependent on external sources of
capital.”).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Because the investor participating in a transaction in the form of debt
has assumed a low risk position, that of the creditor, this necessarily means
that the investor is paid first, assuming there are profits to distribute. See
ROBERT J. RHEE, ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS OF BUSINESS FOR LAWYERS 29 (2012).
The equity participant assumes a higher risk position in anticipation of
higher returns and is therefore paid last, assuming profits remain after all
debt is paid. Id.
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the sugar boom instead of a more prosaic rise or
growth of the sugar industry. 90
Today, the reemergence of Brazilian sugar in the global market
for biofuel replicates the same economic relationships, albeit a more
complex and involved manner.91 A core dynamic remains, and that
is the need for outside or foreign capital and the inability of local
owners to develop the enterprise on their own.
Financing today has gone beyond simple debt structures. This is
largely related to the sophistication of the capital markets and the
innovation of Wall Street investment banks as they create new
products for consumption and new ways to capitalize off or hedge
risks.92 This modern, or post-modern, world of capital, mirrors the
global economy that marked exploration and the New World, where
90

MENARD, supra note 32, at 64–65.
See Larry Rohter, With Big Boost From Sugar Cane, Brazil Is
Satisfying Its Fuel Needs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, http://www.nytim
es.com/2006/04/10/world/americas/10brazil.html?pagewanted=all
(“[E]thanol development has been led by Brazilian companies with limited
capital. But with oil prices soaring, the four international giants that control
much of the world’s agribusiness—Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge and
Born, Cargill and Louis Dreyfuss—have recently begun showing interest.”);
see also CODEXIS INC., FORM 10-K 25 (Mar. 5, 2012) [hereinafter CODEXIS
FORM 10-K] (“These markets are well-established with multiple companies,
such as The Archer Daniels Midland Company, Cargill and a number of
smaller companies producing ethanol in the United States, and Shell
producing ethanol in Brazil.”).
92
For example, credit markets today are marked by products that go
beyond secured and unsecured loans. Complex financial instruments
including collateralized debt offerings (CDOs), asset-backed securities,
credit derivatives, credit-linked notes, and credit enhancements, to name a
few, define a market much larger and broader than could be imagined in the
period of the initial sugar boom. The market has evolved to include products
and financial instruments that permit investors to allocate or shift risk to
other investors desiring exposure to that risk. As a result, there is another
layer of value and capital papering transactions. For insight into structured
finance and the practice of law that concerns these financial instruments, see
Joshua D. Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance (Harvard Bus.
Sch. Fin. Working Paper No. 09-060, 2008), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1287363; Andreas A. Jobst, A Primer on
Structured Finance, 13 J. DERIVATIVES & HEDGE FUNDS, available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.832184.
91
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governments and monarchies funded merchants and explorers to
exploit economies and sources of wealth beyond Europe.
C. BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Brazil regulates its capital markets through the regulatory
agency Comissaõ de Valores Mobiliários93 (CVM) and corporations
through its Lei da Sociedad Anônima 94 (the Corporations Code).
Securities are traded in Brazil through BM&FBovespa. 95 The
framework for regulating the capital market mirrors the U.S.
securities laws, regulatory regime, and disclosure requirements for
publicly-traded corporations.96 For example, like the U.S. Securities
Exchange Commission, the CVM does not pass judgment on the

93

See COMISSAO DE VALORES MOBILIARIOS, http://www.cvm.gov.br
(last visited, Mar. 13, 2013); Legal and Regulatory Structure of the Brazilian
http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/reg
Securities
Markets,
CVM.GOV,
u/Regu.asp#Legal (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). Both the CVM and the
Corporations Code are recent adoptions to Brazil law (i.e. 1970s
phenomenon) while the United States has been regulating the securities
markets since 1933.
94
Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 17.12.1976, available at http://www.cvm.gov. br/ingl/re
gu/law6404r.ASP.
95
BM&FBovespa was formed in 2008 with the merger of Bovespa
(Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo), the stock market, and BM&F (Bolsa de
Mercadorias e Futuros), the commodities and futures market.
BM&FBovespa. About BM&FBovespa, BM&FBOVESPA.COM, (last visited
Mar. 18, 2013).
96
See also Ozden Deniz, Reforming Corporate Governance in
Developing Countries and Emerging Market Economies, 18 NEW ENG. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 67, 72, 87 (2012) (explaining how corporations are crosslisted on foreign stock exchanges and the value behind creating an SEC-like
enforcement agency). See generally Bernard S. Black et al., The Corporate
Governance of Privately Controlled Brazilian Firms, 7 BRAZILIAN REVIEW
OF FINANCE 4 (2009), available at http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/in
dex.php/rbfin/article/view/1450 (providing an overview of Brazil corporate
governance, and noting that most firms publicly traded on the
BM&FBovespa are also cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange and
therefore subject to U.S. securities laws.)

2013]

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF CAPITAL, SLAVE
LABOR, AND THE LANGUAGE OF PROFIT IN THE
MARKET FOR SUGAR ETHANOL

317

merits of an issuance or offering. Rather, the regulatory intent is to
assure investors that all material information is disclosed.97
Because sugar production and maintenance costs continue to be
enormous, traditional forms of capital sourcing have evolved to
reflect more sophisticated participation structures including initial
public offerings, private placements, joint ventures and asset
purchases. In this section, I introduce examples of the above
structures. Please note that these are merely a sampling of local and
foreign companies involved in the sugar trade in Brazil.
1.

THE IPO

In the initial public offering (IPO), local and foreign investors
are offered equity participations, or stock, in an ethanol operating
company, or a larger corporation with a significant wholly-owned
ethanol subsidiary or business arm.98 One of the more notable IPOs
97
Sections of the Corporations Code requiring certain disclosures are
Article 157 of Section IV, Duties and Responsibilities of Chapter XII, and
Chapter XV on financial statements reporting. See Lei No. 6.404, available
at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/regu/law6404r.ASP; Black et. al, supra note
96, (giving a specific breakdown of corporate governance laws (i.e. board
independence, shareholder voting (controlling and minority shareholders),
corporate formalities, etc.)); Nelson Laks Eizirik, The Role of the State in the
Regulation of the Securities Markets: The Brazilian Experience, 1 J. COMP.
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 211, 221, 226 (1978) (discussing the relation between
the disclosure requirements of the CVM and those of the U.S. Securities Act
and U.S. Securities Exchange Act); Norman S. Poser, Securities Regulation
in Developing Countries: The Brazilian Experience, 52 VA. L. REV. 1283,
1298 (1966) (discussing Brazil’s regulatory scheme as relates to capital
markets and similarities with the U.S. approach). While the CVM and
Corporations Code have Brazil-centric differences, for example the laws and
regulations divide the notion of shareholder into two types (controlling
shareholder, with control of the corporations operations, and investor, a
passive participant) which therefore implicates voting rights, the disclosure
requirements are similar in spirit.
98
See COSAN S.A. INDUSTRIA E COMERCIO, SEC PROSPECTUS (Nov. 17,
PROSPECTUS],
available
at
2005)
[hereinafter
COSAN
http://ir.cosan.com.br/list.aspx?idCanal=4v/R0dGFws1gQ5I2T0ZEaA==.
Amyris, Inc., a Delaware corporation doing business in California, went
public in the United States on Sept. 28, 2010 at $16/share. AMYRIS INC.,
SEC Prospectus (Sept. 28, 2010) [hereinafter AMYRIS PROSPECTUS],
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in the U.S. and Brazil capital markets was that of the sovereigncontrolled energy company Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras).99 In
its offering of September 2010, Petrobras raised 120.36 billion reais,
or USD70 billion.100 As indicated in its IPO disclosure documents,
the company continues to be controlled by the Brazil government.101
In 2007, Cosan Limited (Cosan) 102 opened itself up to public
financing and went public on both the U.S. and Brazil capital
markets issuing equity interests in Class A common shares.103 In its
prospectus, Cosan describes itself as the largest sugar and sugar
ethanol producer in Brazil and the third and second largest,
respectively, in the world.104

available at http://invest ors.amyris.com/secfiling.cfm?FilingID=119312510-218728. Amyris uses synthetic biotechnology to genetically modify yeast
for the purpose of converting plant-based sugars into biofuel. See AMYRIS
INC., FORM 10-K 2 (Mar. 14, 2011) (Item 1 Business) [hereinafter AMYRIS
FORM
10-K],
available
at
http://investors.amyris.co
m/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-11-65613&CIK=1365916. The company
has relationships, via development, supply, and distribution agreements with
Total S.A., Petrobras, and Cosan and joint ventures with Usina São Martinho,
a subsidiary of Brazil ethanol company São Martinho S.A., for the purpose
of accessing “feedstock” and developing large-scale production facilities.
AMYRIS PROSPECTUS, at 3. The company also indicates that its “near-term
production primarily [focuses] on the use of Brazilian sugarcane as our
feedstock because of its abundance, low cost and relative price stability.”
AMYRIS FORM 10-K, at 3.
99
In its prospectus supplement, Petrobras indicates an intent to
“increase our production and infrastructure for the commercialization of
biofuels both in Brazil and for export abroad, especially by investing in
companies operating in the biofuel sector, including ethanol.” PETROBRAS
PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 83, at S-13.
100
Id.; see Peter Millard, Petrobras Raises $70 Billion in World’s Largest
Share Sale, BLOOMERG, Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.bloomb
erg.com/news/2010-09-24/petrobras-raises-70-billion-in-world-s-largestshare-sale-to-fund-fields.html; see also, Chris V. Nicholson, Petrobras
Raises $70 Billion in Share Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com
/2010/09/24/petrobras-raises-70-billion-inshare-issue/.
101
PETROBRAS PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 83, at S-39.
102
Cosan’s principal operating company is subsidiary Cosan S.A.
Indústria e Comércio. See COSAN PROSPECTUS, supra note 98.
103
Id. at 1.
104
Id.
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PRIVATE PLACEMENT

In a private placement, stock in a private ethanol operating
company is offered to a limited group generally consisting of
qualified institutional buyers 105 in the United States and other
institutional investors outside the United States and Brazil. For
example, through its joint venture with Cosan, Raízen (described
below), Royal Dutch Shell plc (Shell) holds about 15.5%106 of stock
in Codexis, Inc., a California-based biotechnology company that is
focused on converting cellulosic biomass into sugar for the purpose
of producing ethanol.107 The company has an exclusive agreement
with Shell for the production of biofuel. That agreement expires in
November 2012.108 The company is collaborating with Raízen, its
largest shareholder, for the purpose of “improv[ing] Raízen’s current
first-generation process for manufacturing ethanol from sugarcane”
as well as developing second-generation fuels exclusively with
Shell.109 The Codexis annual report to shareholders, as filed with the
SEC, claims that Raízen “has annual production capacity of over 2
billion liters of ethanol, and is the world’s largest producer of ethanol
from sugarcane, with 600 million gallons produced in 2010.”110
3.

JOINT VENTURE

The joint venture, a business organization in which two
companies come together to form a separate corporation or limited
liability company (the venture) to pursue a common business interest
for a particular time frame, is perhaps the more common approach to
investing and participating in the sugar ethanol market. Agricultural
companies and certainly energy corporations have taken this form to
participate in a variety of sugar-related activity. Raízen is an
example of this.111
105

17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1)(i) (1933) (noting that qualified
institutional buyers must have ability to invest $100 million of discretionary
income in securities that are not affiliated with the investor).
106
CODEXIS FORM 10-K, supra note 91, at 13, 48.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 14.
109
Id. at 13.
110
Id.
111
Raízen’s website describes the company’s activities as follows:
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M&A

In addition, there is activity in the mergers and acquisitions
market as well as the market for one-off asset purchases.112 In 2010,
ETH Bioenergia acquired Brenco, a Brazilian ethanol producer
“backed by venture capitalist Vinod Khosla and AOL founder Steve
Case.”113 ETH Bioenergia is a private company controlled primarily
by Brazilian construction and energy company, Odebrecht, and
Japanese trading group, Sojitz Corporation 114 Prior to that merger,
Brenco was active in the asset purchase front. 115 In 2009, Bunge

A Brazilian organization which produces annually more
then [sic] 2.2 billions of liters of Ethanol, in order to
attend the national and international market, 4 million
tons of sugar, and installed capacity of 900 MW of
electric energy from sugar cane bagasse. The company
has over 4,500 service stations for retail fuel distribution
in Brazil, over 500 convenience stores, 53 fuel
distribution depots and aviation fuel business [sic] in 54
airports in Brazil.
In addition, the name is explained:
The name Raízen is the union of the words ‘root’
and ’energy’ in Portuguese. The first word means the
portion of the plant that takes in nourishment and water
necessary for life; and the second is the critical factor for
any dynamic: in order to have life or movement, there
must be energy.
Who We Are, RAIZEN.COM, http://www.raizen.com/en/raizen/quemsomos.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
112
See Hiratuka, supra note 82, at 5 (discussing the importance of
mergers and acquisitions activity in Brazil).
113
Update 4-Brazil’s ETH Acquires Brenco, Forms Ethanol Giant,
REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/18/ethbrenco-idUSN1820330020100218.
114
Id.
115
See Darryl Isherwood, Bunge to Acquire Brazilian Sugar Producer
Usina Moema Participacoes, FOXBUSINESS (Dec. 24, 2009),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/bunge-acquire-brazilian-sugarproducer-usina-moema-participacoes/.
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Limited, a global agribusiness corporation, acquired Brazilian sugar
company Usina Moema Participaoes.116
5.

DERIVATIVES

As addressed in the introduction to this paper, there is another
layer of capital market activity that is unknown or invisible to the
average person: the derivatives market.117 Derivatives (also known
as synthetic financial instruments) are contracts between two parties
(generally institutional investors, such as banks or hedge funds) in
which the value of that contract is derived through reference to an
external asset (hence the term derivative).118 Ultimately, through this
contract the parties trade the exposure to risk. For example, a
currency hedge agreement is a derivative contract in which one party
with exposure to currency risk (say an American corporation doing
business in Brazil, and therefore exposed to fluctuations in value of
the real) contracts with another party, the counterparty, who will
make payments equivalent to the losses associated with currency
fluctuations. 119
As consideration for these payments, the
116
Bunge to acquire Brazil sugar cane firm Moema Par, ICIS NEWS
(Dec. 24, 2009), http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/12/24/9321864/bungeto-acquire-brazil-sugarcane-firm-moema-par.html.
117
The derivatives market, at least in the context of the credit market
collapse of 2008, has been called a shadow banking system as well as an
invisible hand (invoking Adam Smith’s position that there is an invisible
hand unknown to the investor guiding his decisions). See Gary B. Gorton,
Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007
(May 9, 2009), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1401882; see also SMITH,
supra note 5, at ch. 2, ¶ 9 (“By preferring the support of domestic to that of
foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that
industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.”).
118
See Jobst, supra note 92, at 5.
119
A derivative contract, including a currency hedge agreement, would
be documented on the standard form agreement published by the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, called the ISDA Master
Agreement (1992 or 2002). The agreement is accompanied by a Schedule
(indicating any changes to the form agreement), Credit Support Annex
(indicating any collateral) and one or more Confirmations (documenting
specific transactions). The example hedge agreement I mention above is an
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counterparty receives a fee. The counterparty agrees to this contract
because it benefits the counterparty’s portfolio of investments or is
itself a hedge to another contract with a different counterparty.
While not the focus of this paper, I believe it important to
recognize that in the current capital market value is not simply
derived through labor. Value in transactions arises from synthetic
instruments papering the deal as well as speculative contracts (e.g.
futures, options). 120 In addition, as with international project
finance, 121 the role of sovereign funds is relevant as is the role of
derivative and other complex financial instruments.
While I have no direct knowledge, based on my experience
working on structured finance transactions (including hybrid and
synthetic collateralized debt offerings) and based on existing
literature, I am confident that derivatives, through swaps and hedging
contracts, play a significant role in generating value and profitability
in the sugar market. In terms of dollars, I would not be surprised if
they exceed the equity valuation. 122 In addition, in making this
oversimplification of the terms of the contracts, but sufficiently
communicates the arrangement and payment structure between the parties.
See ISDA, http://www.ISDA.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). On the purpose
of currency hedges, see Paul J. Lim, Those Euro Bets Have Many Ifs,
N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/yourmoney/currency-hedging-has-many-ifs-for-investors.html.
120
See supra text accompanying note 115.
121
See generally Baker, supra note 12.
122
See Sugar No. 11 Futures, INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE,
https://www.theice.com/productguide/ProductSpec.shtml;jsessionid=8FA439
E65D6C170FB581D9DA08BA134D?specId=23#data (last visited Jul. 25,
2012) [hereinafter ICE SUGAR FUTURES] (displaying charts that show the role
of futures contracts in the sugar market). Determining the size of the
derivatives market is a challenge because of transparency. The Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) tracks market activity for derivatives (e.g.
currency hedges, interest rate swaps, equity linked contracts, commodity
hedges, credit default swaps). The notional value for over-the-counter
derivatives for the year ending December 2011 was USD 647.76 trillion. See
Table 19: Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, by
Risk Category and Instrument, BIS, http://www.bis.org/statistics
/otcder/dt1920a.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). The number of reporting
countries rose to thirteen, with the addition of Spain and Australia. Notional
value is the value of the contract, versus the actual amount (substantially less
than notional value) invested in the contract. Compare the value of the
global derivatives market with the world’s gross domestic product for 2011
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argument I also refer to the extensive and growing literature on the
role of speculation in commodities markets as an underlying cause of
the global rise of food prices in 2008.123
I raise the issue of derivatives as a final piece to the discussion
on how capital enters the sugar market so as to touch the notion that
value and profit are a fiction—the issue being who really creates
value for whom. Although outside the realm of Marx’s imagination,
I would describe the derivatives market as the ultimate in the
fetishism of commodity because it creates capital accumulation
independent of costs associated with labor or natural resources. In
this shadow market, capital itself regenerates through a synthetic
form and creates a magnificent layer of value, further alienating
labor. Even the commodity is alienated as science moves to create a
synthetic form of biofuel (the second generation) that produces value
completely independent of the natural resource.
* * *
In each of the above-referenced financing structures, the power
of capital is expanded, whether there is an allocation of risk, as in the
joint venture, or the sale of an equity or ownership stake in exchange
for cheaply accessible capital via IPO. In addition, in each of the
of $69,971,508. Gross Domestic Product 2011, THE WORLD BANK,
http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/GDP.pdf (last visited July
30, 2012) (ranking the top six GDPs: U.S. $15,094,000; China $7,298,097;
Japan $5,867,154; Germany $3,570,556; France $2,773,032; Brazil
$2,476,652).
See generally INTERNATIONAL SUGAR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.isosugar.org (last visited Feb. 22, 2013) (an international trade
organization).
123
In 2008, food prices escalated, having a devastating impact on
underdeveloped countries. See Editorial, The World Food Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/10/opinion
/10thu1.html?_r=0; Baffes & Haniotis, supra note 15; Mitchell, supra note 8;
see also Report on Causes of the 2007–2008 Global Food Crisis Identified,
SCI. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y (Eur. Comm’n, DG Env’t News Alert Serv.), Jan. 20,
2011 (citing DEREK HEADEY & SHENGGEN FAN, INT’L FOOD POLICY
RESEARCH INST., RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 165, REFLECTIONS ON THE GLOBAL
FOOD CRISIS (2010)), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integ
ration/research/newsalert/pdf/225na1.pdf. See generally THE RENEWABLE
FUELS AGENCY, THE GALLAGHER REVIEW OF THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF
BIOFUELS PRODUCTION 61 (2008) (discussing the impact of biofuels on the
global food market and global poverty).
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above structures, the capital is foreign, and largely from the Global
North. Thus, participation in the sugar boom can take multiple
complex forms, each satisfying or aligning the investor with the
proper exposure or allocation of risk. One of the challenges, given
the sophisticated financing structures, is access to information.
Because much of the investing activity is private, disclosure is
absent. For example, while publicly traded corporations are subject
to disclosure requirements, specific investment activity (the various
joint ventures, stock ownership, etc.) may occur through privately
held subsidiaries. The financials associated with these transactions
are merely consolidated into the parent’s reporting as is permitted by
GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) rules.124 A public
corporation, therefore, has discretion on how to report material
information on its periodic reports.125
The above-referenced business structures reflect that capital
immigrating to Brazil is in the form of participation with
corporations that already have a presence in Brazil. In other words,
much of the foregoing investment occurs indirectly. With direct
investments, outside capital sources are directly acquiring property
and land; whereas in Brazil, outside sources are also joining local and
existing corporations in the expansion of an existing bioenergy
effort. 126 Although discussed shortly, indirect participation is
significant because it allows foreign investors to circumvent
restrictions in foreign landownership.
However, while direct
ownership of land is circumvented, control of that property is not.
It is important to note that the sugar ethanol market is essentially
a combination of two approaches: agricultural and scientific. By
124

See FASB Issues FASB Statements No. 141(R), Business
Combinations, and No. 160, Noncontrolling Interests in Consolidated
Financial Statements, Dec. 4, 2007, http://www.fasb.org/news/nr12
0407.shtml.
125
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §77, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml.
126
See Alexander Kliment & Vivianne Rodrigues, China’s 0.6% Stake
in Brazil’s Land Feud, FT TILT (July 27, 2011, 1:15 PM),
http://tilt.ft.com/#!posts/2011-07/26256/brazil-study-more-limits-on-foreignland-owners (archived blog) (explaining that the current figure of foreignowned Brazilian land “may not capture lands help by foreigners through
partnerships with local companies”); see also infra notes 144–45 on foreign
direct ownership of land.
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agricultural, I mean the traditional form of cultivating and processing
sugarcane (essentially the process that this paper largely focuses on).
However, while the agricultural approach needs perfecting, as
companies try to determine efficiency in a volatile commodities
market, a parallel process is being developed. The same companies
partnering in sugar agriculture are also funding or partnering with
companies doing research in genetically modified forms of various
organisms that produce the sugar that produces ethanol. 127
Therefore, the sugar market is effectively two markets in one: a
natural and a synthetic one, or as discussed in magazines, first
generation and second generation.128
At the end of the day, there is a significant influx of capital into
Brazil as foreign capital discovers another “emerging market.”
D. THE ILLUSORY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

127

See BRONSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 101–02. BP, for example,
contributed start-up capital to a company called Qteros, which was born out
of research at the University of Massachusetts. Qteros developed the “Q
microbe” which converts plant waste to biofuel. See Jim Lane, Portrait of a
Transformative Technology: Qteros and its Q Microbe, BIOFUELS DIG., June
24, 2010, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2010/06
/portrait-of-a-transformative-technology-qteros-and-its-q-microbe;
Jim
Kinney, Reborn Qteros Rises Again with New Plan to Develop Technology
REPUBLICAN,
Dec.
20,
2012,
to
Make
Ethanol,
THE
http://www.masslive.com/business-news/index.ssf/2012/12/qteros_rises
_again_with_a_new_business_m.html. Shell, more recently through Raízen,
is invested in Iogen Corporation, which creates genetically modified
microbes that break down plant material. Jim Lane, Iogen Makes a
Comeback in Landmark Sugarcane Cellulosic Ethanol Deal with Brazil’s
Raízen, BIOFUELS DIG., Oct. 16, 2012, http://www.biofuelsdige
st.com/bdigest/2012/10/16/iogen-makes-a-comeback-in-landmarksugarcane-cellulosic-ethanol-deal-with-brazils-raizen/; see supra text
accompanying note 111 on Raízen.
128
See CODEXIS FORM 10-K, supra note 91, at 8; BRONSON ET AL., supra
note 10, at 56; see also AMYRIS FORM 10-K, supra note 98. Discussion of the
second generation, or synthetic market, which involves genetic modification
of natural organisms, is outside the scope of this paper. However, this
market raises a plethora of issues from ethics, to biosafety risks and hazards,
and to capital market concerns.
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Brazil is generally welcoming to outside investors, with the
possible exception of investors seeking to acquire rural land. 129
While in fact the government has permitted outside interests to
control, access, or dominate markets, there are significant
protectionist policies related to foreign acquisition of land.130 That
said, the Brazilian government itself is heavily vested in the market
via sovereign funds or interests such as its positions in Banco
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) and the
energy company, Petrobras. 131 The government is also extremely
129

See also GALEANO, supra note 4, at 215–19. Galeano recounts
Brazil’s history with foreign investment, even through periods of dictatorship.
He describes the incredible entry of foreign capital in the 1960s, when at one
point foreign capital was found to control 40% of the market. Half of that
capital was American in origin and the other half German. About the
Castelo Branco dictatorship in particular, Galeano writes:
The dictatorship hawked the country to foreign
capitalists as a pimp offers a woman, and put the stress
where it belonged: ‘The treatment of foreigners in Brazil
is among the most liberal in the world . . . no general
restrictions are in effect with reference to the nationality
of owners, partners, or shareholders. . . . There is no limit
to the percentage of the registered capital that may be
remitted as profit. . . . No limitation is placed on the
repatriation of capital, and reinvestment of profits is
considered as an increase of the original capital . . . .’
Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Compare Hiratuka,
supra note 82 with infra note 158 on the role of bilateral investment treaties
or agreements.
130
Id.
131
The desire of the Brazilian government to create a global ethanol
powerhouse has influenced a foreign capital-friendly environment. The
government itself is involved in the financing of the trade via the sovereign
bank BNDES. In 2010, BNDES’s total disbursement into the financial
sector totaled 139.7 billion real with 4.5 billion real allocated to the
mechanical industry, including biofuel projects. For the government, biofuel
is the priority. See BNDES, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 51–52 (2011),
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes_pt/Galerias/
Arquivos/empresa/RelAnual/ra2011/relatorio_anual2011_trilingue.pdf; see
also Podcast Interview with Carlos Eduardo Cavalcanti, Head of Biofuels
Department at BNDES, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (July 21, 2011),
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/partner/green-powerconferences-3234/news/article/2011/07/podcast-interview-with-carloseduardo-cavalcanti-head-of-biofuels-department-at-bndes; Brazil Pledges
R$1 Billion for Innovation in Sugar and Ethanol Sectors, PORTAL BRASIL
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vested in economic policies that stimulate ethanol production with
the expectation that Brazil become a controlling international
presence in the world of sugar ethanol.132
In this subsection, I examine the role that the government plays
(via the law) in structuring and influencing economic hierarchies and
relationships. Brazil has chosen to regulate foreign ownership of
agricultural land while encouraging capital to exercise control
indirectly and while failing to enforce laws that protect human rights
and the environment. That said, in fairness to Brazil, the inequities
in landownership are historically so stark, prompting occupations by
the MST (discussed herein). The problem here is that capital is
invisible but land on the other hand is quite visible, and the state is
failing to address this.

1.

THE LAND

Land in Brazil is a source of power. The
landowners are the powerful. Inequality in Brazil
can be traced directly to who owns land.133
Land ownership in Brazil is historically a source of instability
and violence.134 There seems to be two very different questions that
(Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.brasil.gov.br/news /history/2011/03/22/bndesand-finep-signs-r-1-billion-agreement-to-finance-innovation-in-the-sugarand-ethanol-sector/print.
132
See generally Höges, supra note 31; see also Henry Chu, Brazil’s
Leftists No Longer See President as Their Champion, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/26/world/fg-lula26; Juscelino F.
Colares, A Brief History of Brazilian Biofuels Legislation, 35 SYRACUSE J.
INT’L L. & COM. 293 (2008).
133
Ben Lilliston, Inst. for Agric. & Trade Policy, Land and Power in
Brazil, THINK FORWARD BLOG (Mar. 22, 2011), http://iatp.typepad.com/t
hinkforward/2011/03/land-and-power-in-brazil.html.
134
See MONSALVE SUÁREZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 18 n.28 (citing
JOÃO ALFREDO TELLES MELO, REFORMA AGRÁRIA QUANDO? CPI MOSTRA AS
CAUSAS DA LUTA PELA TERRA NO BRASIL [AGRARIAN REFORM WHEN? CPI
SHOWS THE CAUSES OF THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND IN BRAZIL] 44ss (Brasília:
Senado Federal 2006)):
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impact the biofuel production in Brazil: (1) who owns the land, and
(2) who controls, or has access, to the land? The land registers of the
Instututo Nacional de Coloniza ão e Reforma Agrária (INCRA)
seem to be unreliable.135 The lack of transparency of land ownership
is also attributed to the land tenure in Brazil.136
In terms of social effects, the result is increased tensions
between large agribusiness interests and local farmers and rural
landowners. 137 According to the U.N. Food and Agriculture
The INCRA Register is based on reports and its data
contains inaccuracies. According to a statement made by
the Ministry for Agrarian Development to the Mixed
Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on Land (2004),
approximately 200 million hectares of land in Brazil
have not been formally identified in any register.
According to existing registers, out of the 850 million
hectares of the national territory, 420 million are private
properties, 102 million are environmental conservation
areas and 128 million are indigenous areas. The lack of
information favours illegality and legal instability in the
area of land tenure, stimulating illegal appropriation of
public lands (land grabbing).
See also Lilliston, supra note 133 (“‘The country doesn’t know much about
who owns the land. We don’t know how much land is in foreign control.
The Brazil agency has no data. They just don’t know,’ Alentejano told us.”).
See generally Olivier De Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for
Farmland and the Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503 (2011)
(focusing on the “land-grab” phenomenon in the Global South, specifically
Sub-Saharan Africa).
135
See id.
136
See Kristen Mitchell, Market-Assisted Land Reform in Brazil: A
New Approach to Address an Old Problem, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 557, 563–72 (2003) (discussing the legacy of the land tenure system of
Brazil in creating inequitable land distribution and sustaining poverty, and
examining market-based reform as an alternative to traditional land
distribution methods). Market-based land reform gives the landless access to
credit or aid for the purpose of acquiring land. Id. at 582–83; see also Roy L.
Prosterman & Tim Hanstad, Land Reform in the Twenty-First Century: New
Challenges, New Reponses, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 763 (2006)
(discussing land reform and rural poverty, and the scope of the problem
generally); COMM. ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY [CFS], POLICY ROUNDTABLE:
LAND TENURE AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE, U.N. DOC.
CFS:2010/7 (Oct. 11–14 &16, 2010), available at http://www.fao.o
rg/docrep/meeting/019/k8929e.pdf.
137
See supra note 16.
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Organization (FAO), unequal land distribution affects the country’s
GINI index,138 which indicates that Brazil has inequality as compared
to other countries, represented by a coefficient of 0.85 for land
distribution for 1990.139 A GINI coefficient of 0 represents perfect
equality (in other words, everyone’s income is the same), 140 and a
GINI coefficient of 1 represents absolute inequality (in other words,
income is concentrated in one person).141 The Economist reports that
most countries fall between a GINI coefficient of 0.25 and 0.6.142
A significant activist movement is attempting to ameliorate the
situation. The Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra
(MST), or Landless Rural Workers’ Movement, is pushing for
redistribution of land interests and certainly distribution of land to the
rural poor.143
138
For an explanation of GINI Index, see The World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/f
CIA.GOV,
ields/272.html (last visited July 24, 2012).
See also GINI Index,
WORLDBANK.ORG, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/ (last
visited July 24, 2012) (describing the purpose and function of the GINI
Index).
139
See 1990 Round of Agricultural Censuses, FAO.ORG,
http://www.fao.org/economic/the-statistics-division-ess/world-census-ofagriculture/additional-international-comparison-tables-including-ginicoefficients/table-1-number-and-area-of-holdings-and-ginis-index-ofconcentration-1990-round-of-agricultural-censuses/ar/ (last visited July, 24,
2012); see also Fabiana Frayssinet, Brazil: Agribusiness Driving Land
Concentration, GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS & POL. ECON. (Oct. 6, 2009),
http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2009/10/06/brazil-agribusinessdriving-land-concentration/ (indicating a .872 land GINI reported by
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 2006 Census of Agriculture).
The FIAN Report claims Brazil’s GINI coefficient in 2000 was 0.802.
MONSALVE SUÁREZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 4,18.
140
Unbottled GINI Inequality Is Rising. Does it Matter—and if so
Why?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.economist.com/
node/17957381 (“A common yardstick is the Gini coefficient, which runs
from 0 (everyone has the same income) to 1 (one person has all the
income)”).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
See PATEL, supra note 6, at 204–13 (The World’s Most Important
Social Movement); see also Kevin E. Colby, Brazil and the MST:
Land Reform and Human Rights, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2003); Bradley S.
Romig, Agriculture in Brazil and its Effect on Deforestation and the
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According to the Financial Times, foreign direct ownership of
land is minimal and calculated at 0.53% of the country. 144
Compelling to me, however, is that 30% of the Mato Grosso and
Mato Grosso do Sul areas145—where much of the sugar and soybean
production occurs—is reported to be owned by foreigners with Japan
being the largest holder.146 That said, I am not compelled by foreign
ownership of land which is why I am not compelled by recent
protectionist policies instituted by the Brazilian government that limit
foreign ownership of land.147
The government has reinstated a law from the 1970s, Federal
Law No. 5.709/71,148 described by The Economist as antiquated and
restrictive of foreign ownership of Brazilian land.149 According to a
2011 article in The Economist:

Landless Movement: A Government's Attempt to Balance Agricultural
Success and Social Collateral Damage, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 81, 92–103
(2006); Lilliston, supra note 133; Kenfield, supra note 16, at 5.
144
Kliment & Rodrigues, supra note 126 (disclaiming that the register
may not capture land control via foreign partnerships with local companies);
see also Alexei Barrionuevo, China’s Interest in Farmland Makes Brazil
Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/wo
rld/americas/27brazil.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing Brazil’s move
toward regulations that limit on direct foreign ownership of land, with land
grabs by China causing most concern).
145
Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul are states located in the center
west part of Brazil, abutting Bolivia and Paraguay. The northern section of
Mato Grosso border the Amazon rain forest. These states are rural, with
terrain ranging from rain forest to savannah. Significant harvesting of
soybean including some sugarcane occurs in Mato Grosso, with charcoal in
Mato Grosso do Sul. The geography and distance from urban centers makes
these areas susceptible to slave labor and practices. See BALES, supra note
35; see MONSALVE SUÁREZ ET AL., supra note 36.
146
See Kliment & Rodrigues, supra note 126.
147
See id.
148
Lei No. 5.709, de 7 de Outubro de 1971, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 7.10.1971.
149
See Thiago Assumpção Henriques & Bernardo Pimentel Barbosa
Perssoa, Restrictions on Acquisition and Leasing of Rural Land in Brazil,
LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP. (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.su
llcrom.com/files/Publication/ac6bddcd-4490-4629-94dc47baf8600300/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5c9db260-6b56-4f6d985b-4c3316b94d07/Korb_Gadwood_Gross_LALBR_Feb_2011.pdf
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Farmland is being treated as a strategic asset on a
par with oil. Last year, spooked by the idea of
foreign sovereign-wealth funds and state-owned
firms buying up vast tracts, the government
resurrected a 1971 law limiting the amount of rural
land foreigners can buy. It was revived even
though in the 1990s it was deemed incompatible
with the new democratic constitution and open
economy. The details are under review: foreigners
may be allowed to buy a bit more without
restriction, and still more if the government thinks
it is in the national interest. But there is no
timetable for passing a new law. The Brazilian
Rural Society estimates that $15 billion of planned
foreign agriculture investments are being
dropped.150
In 2010, Brazil’s Attorney General, the Advocacia Geral da
União (AGU), reinstated by legal opinion151 Article 1, paragraph 1 of
the 1970 law, which differentiates between Brazilian incorporated
companies that are controlled by foreign shareholders and those that
are not. 152 In past interpretations of this paragraph, the AGU
declared the paragraph unconstitutional, and not in accordance with
the understanding of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988.153
Notwithstanding the restrictions, companies may appeal to the
President of Brazil, Brazilian Agriculture Ministry, or the
Department of Trade for authorization of purchase or activity beyond
the restrictions.154

(translation of authors’ article originally published in the Azevedo Sette
Advogados).
150
Protectionism in Brazil: A Self-made Siege—First They Went for the
Currency, Now for the Land, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2011, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21530144/.
151
T.J.R.J., No. 01/2010, de 30 de Junho de 2010, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO
RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.U.E.R.J.] de 23.7.2010.
152
Henriques & Perssoa supra, note 149 (explaining that control by
foreign shareholder is similar to the U.S. concept of controlling shareholder’s
ability to dictate or influence business, or control the voting process).
153
Id.
154
Id. Provisions of the law include the requirement that foreign
companies can only acquire rural land for the purposes of farming, cattle
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While Federal Law 5.709/71 may restricts direct ownership, it
does not solve the issue of control as highlighted earlier. Companies
that invest in biofuel are large food corporations, chemical
companies, energy companies, and bioengineering companies. 155
Acquisition of Brazilian rural land is wholly unnecessary given the
partnerships or leasing arrangements that can be created with local
landowners.156 Ultimately, a corporation does not need ownership to
thrive; what it needs is control or simply, access. 157 As outside
capital grows it develops more and more access to the asset and the
natural resource.158

raising, and industrial or settlement projects, and such projects must be
specified in the company’s by-laws. Id.
155
See Kenfield, supra note 16 (discussing the role of agribusiness
corporations (with significant presence in the soybean market) in investing in
biofuel development, listing Louis Dreyfus Commodities, Tereos, and
Cargill); BRONSON ET AL., supra note 10; PATEL, supra note 6 (discussing
influence and interest of Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, Monsanto
Company, Bunge Limited, and Cargill).
156
See Kliment & Rodrigues, supra note 126; Mendelson Lima et al.,
Deforestation and the Social Impacts of Soy for Biodiesel: Perspectives of
Farmers in the South Brazilian Amazon, 16 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 4 at 2, 13
(2011), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss4/art4/.
157
Once the European elite discovered “sweetness,” sugar came under
elite control as Europeans appropriated sugarcane for their exclusive
consumption. See Schneider, supra note 2.
158
A tool of international trade to consider is the bilateral investment
treaty or bilateral investment agreements (BIT), an arrangement between
sovereigns to encourage and stimulate foreign development and investment.
See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959–1999, U.N. DOC.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/
poiteiiad2.en.pdf. Brazil has historically resisted BITs and has refused to
ratify on the basis that BITs conflict with the Brazil Constitution. See
UNCATD, Total Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded, June 1,
2011, available at http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_brazil.pdf
(noting BITs signed by Brazil but not ratified or entered into). Lack of
ratification gives foreign investors no reason to purchase agricultural land as
they are unable to avail themselves of the protections of the BIT. BITs tend
to be extremely protective of foreign investors, giving them more rights than
domestic investors in the event that the value of their property declines as a
consequence of environmental regulation, labor regulation, water allocation
rights, land regulation, etc. Professor Carmen González discusses the Latin
American resistance to BITs and subsequent relaxing of restrictive measures
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THE AMAZON: DEFORESTATION & THE FOREST CODE

A distinction must be made between what is known as the
Amazon biome and the Legal Amazon. The Amazon biome refers to
the rain forest that many automatically think of when they hear the
term Amazon. 159 The Legal Amazon (Amazônia Legal) is an
administrative area that is not entirely biome, but is also cerrado160
(savannah) and encompasses south-central Brazil, including the
states of Acre, Amazônia, Rondônia, Rozima, Amapá, Pará, Mato
Grosso, and parts of Tocantines and Maranhão.161
The Brazil Forest Code of 1965 was passed to protect 80% of
the Amazon from deforestation caused by farming. 162 However,
enforcement has been minimal, and as documented by various
organizations, agencies, research studies, and media, deforestation of
the Amazon is a persistent problem. 163 During the first quarter of
once countries found themselves without access to traditional forms of
financing. Carmen González, China’s Engagement with Latin America:
Partnership or Plunder?, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE GREEN ECONOMY:
REDEFINING THE CHALLENGES FOR PEOPLE, STATES AND CORPORATIONS
(Elena Merino-Blanco & Jona Razzaque eds., 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029417.
159
Lima et al., supra note 156.
160
See id. (“International attention on deforestation in Brazil tends to
focus on the Amazon biome. However, the loss of Cerrado forest is also of
concern.”).
161
Id.; see also Lima et al., supra note 156 (stating that sugarcaneproducing areas comprise 61% of Brazil’s territory). See generally Juliano
Assunção, et. al., Deforestation in the Amazon: Prices or Policies? 3–35
(Climate Policy Initiative Rio de Janeiro, Working Paper, 2012), available at
http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/deforestation-slowdown-in-thelegal-amazon-prices-or-policie/; Sugarcane Producing Regions in Brazil,
http://english.unica.com.br/content/show.asp?cntCode=%
UNICA.COM,
7BD6C39D36-69BA-458D-A95C-815C87E4404D% 7D (last visited Feb.
22, 2013)..
162
C.FLOR., Lei No. 4.771 (Braz. 1965) (revogado pela C.FLOR., Lei
No. 12.651 (Braz. 2012)); C.FLOR., Lei No. 7.803 (Braz. 1989); C.FLOR, 281
Medida Provisória 2.1667-67 (Braz. 2001); C.FLOR., Lei No. 12.651 (Braz.
2012).
163
Lima et al., supra note 156 (quoting studies of deforestation
attributed to soy and other agribusiness activity in Brazil and documenting
the impact of biofuel production in deforestation of Mato Grosso area,
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2012, the Brazilian legislative body enacted amendments to the
Forest Code, which would relax many of the provisions that
protected certain rural areas from human occupation. 164 However,
President Dilma Rousseff vetoed twelve articles of the new code in
part on the basis that the amendments were “vague” or “imprecise”
in dealing with preservation, or “did not articulate environmental
parameters with social and productive criteria . . .”165 That said, the
veto could be overturned by the legislature.166
According to the Ethanol Book published by BNDES, sugarcane
is grown in most states, with the most significant concentration
occurring in the mid-south to southeast, which accounts for 85% of
production.167 The state of São Paolo is reported to produce 60% of
the cane; however, production in the Mato Grasso area, where much
cultivation of soybean occurs, is seeing an increase as price and
availability of land decreases in São Paolo. 168 The Ethanol Book
including the cerrado); see also BNDES, supra note 40, at 84; Assunção et
al., supra note 161, at 35 (describing deforestation activity, albeit at a slow
rate due to Brazil conservation efforts); Alexei Barrionuevo, Brazil:
Government Vows Crackdown on Cattle Ranchers in the Amazon, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/world/
americas/19briefs-Brazil.html.
164
See Eduardo Soares, Brazil: 12 Articles of New Forestry Code
Vetoed by the Government, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (June 4, 2012),
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205403176_text; Lei
No. 12.651, supra note 162; see also Brazil’s New Forest Code Faces
International Opposition, PUBLIC RADIO INT’L (May 17, 2012)
http://www.pri.org/stories/science/environment/brazil-s-new-forest-codefaces-international-opposition-9903.html.
165
Soares, supra note 164.
166
Id.
167
BNDES, supra note 40, at 156. According to the Ethanol Book,
“Sugarcane has been cultivated in Brazil since 1532, when it was introduced
by Martim Afonso, the first Portuguese colonizer, who intended to build
sugar mills such as those already existing at the time on the Azores Islands.”
Id. at 155.
168
Id. at 156; see Sugarcane Production in Mato Grosso Expected to
Increase 6%, SOYBEAN & CORN ADVISOR (Mar. 21, 2011),
http://www.soybeansandcorn.com/news/Mar21_11-Sugarcane-Productionin-Mato-Grosso-Expected-to-Increase-6 [hereinafter SOYBEAN & CORN
ADVISOR]; see also Rohter, supra note 91. The mills in the Mato Grosso
region are expected to produce about 1 billion litres of ethanol in 2011,
enough to satisfy the regional demand. SOYBEAN & CORN ADVISOR. In
addition, Adecoagro, S.A., a leading agribusiness and energy company with
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claims that the Amazon, presumably the biome, is an illogical
geographic area for the cultivation of sugarcane because sugarcane
does not attain good productivity in climates such as those found in
wet equatorial regions.169
However, I have found no claim that sugarcane is planted in the
Amazon biome. Rather, the concern is that planting sugarcane—and
soy—for the purpose of satisfying global biofuel demand results in
displacement of land used for grazing cattle, as well as growing other
crops for food purposes. 170 The result is that these activities are
pushed into protected areas, which results in deforestation not
permitted by the Forest Code. 171 Presumably, this caveat is an
attempt by Brazil’s sovereign development bank, BNDES, to respond
to environmentalists that argue that the market for sugar ethanol has
created devastation in the rain forests of the Amazon. There is
dispute about whether indirect deforestation is a consequence of
using pastureland, for example, in Mato Grosso or whether what is
really happening is that “largely abandoned or degraded pasture land
[is being put] back into production.”172

a significant presence in Latin America, currently owns one sugar mill in the
state of Mato Grosso du Sul called Angélica, a new modern mill that has a
“sugarcane crushing capacity of 4 million tons per year.” ADECOAGRO S.A.,
SEC PROSPECTUS 153 (Jan. 28, 2011) [hereinafter ADECOAGRO PROSPECTUS]
(“Sugar, Ethanol and Energy Business: We believe we are a growing and
efficient producer of sugar and ethanol in Brazil. We cultivate and harvest
sugarcane, which is then processed in our own mills to produce sugar,
ethanol and electric energy. As of September 30, 2010, our overall sugarcane
plantation consisted of 54,352 hectares, planted over both owned and leased
land. We currently own and operate two sugar and ethanol mills, UMA
[Usina Monte Alegre] and Angélica [Agroenergia Angélica], with a total
crushing capacity of 5.2 million tons of sugarcane per year.”). The harvest is
largely mechanized and the plant’s electricity is generated through the sugar
bagasse by-product. Id. Adecoagro is in the process of raising funds for a
third Mato Grosso mill, Ivinhema. Id. at 183. The mill is expected to cost
close to $700 million. Id. at 184.
169
See BNDES, supra note 40, at 69.
170
See Lima et al., supra note 156; Rohter, supra note 91 (“Much of
the deforestation is caused by the soybean production but also by beef cattle
ranchers. As land is used to grow, the pasture land gets pushed into the rain
forest.”); see also Barrionuevo, supra note 163; PATEL, supra note 6, at ch. 7.
171
Rohter, supra note 91.
172
Id.


336

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 9.2

While some report that the rates of deforestation are at their
lowest, 173 there is documentation that deforestation of the Mato
Grosso region is increasing exponentially. The New York Times
revealed that the rate of deforestation in the period between August
and April 2010 increased by 26% compared to the same period the
prior year. 174 The Brazilian government defends the practice by
arguing that there is no new deforestation.175 Rather, the cultivation
of sugarcane is occurring in previously exploited parts of the
rainforest.176 However, environmentalists are concerned about future
rates of deforestation: Once the production of sugar rises, specifically
to satisfy global sugar ethanol demand, then rates of deforestation
will increase as it will be more cost effective to “raze virgin forest
than recover already devastated lands.”177
3.

173

HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

E.g., Assunção et al., supra note 161.
Barrionuevo, supra note 163.
175
For the Brazilian government, “deforestation” is occurring on land
that has already been destroyed. In the Stuffed & Starved chapter entitled
“Glycine Rex” in which Patel introduces the infiltration of the soybean into
just about every food, including chocolate, Patel also discusses the notion of
deforestation in the Mato Grosso area of Brazil, where significant cultivation
of soybean also occurs. He quotes the governor of Mato Grosso as saying in
2003: “To me, a 40 percent increase in deforestation doesn’t mean anything
at all, and I don’t feel the slightest guilt over what we are doing here. We are
talking about an area larger than Europe that has barely been touched, so
there is nothing at all to get worried about.” Patel, supra note 6, at 188
(citing Amanda Cassel & Raj Patel, FOOD FIRST: INST. FOR FOOD & DEV.
POLICY, Policy Brief No. 8: Agricultural Trade Liberalization and Brazil's
Rural Poor: Consolidating Inequality (Aug. 2003)); see also SOYBEAN &
CORN ADVISOR, supra note 168 (“In recent years, the government has been
pushing for the conversion of degraded pastureland into new crop production
such as soybeans, sugarcane, or palm oil in order to reduce the amount of
deforestation in Brazil. The state of Mato Grosso has 2.5 million hectares of
land classified as degraded pastures, which are pastures that have a very low
carrying capacity for cattle ranching.”).
176
See Barrionuevo, supra note 163.
177
Amazon Rainforest may be used to Grow Sugarcane for Ethanol,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 10, 2007, available at http://english.pravd
a.ru/news/business/09-10-2007/98492-sugarcane_eth anol-0/.
174
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Brazil has ratified most, if not all, significant international
human rights treaties and instruments and has incorporated these
rights into its Constitución Política de 1988, con reformas de 1996
(Brazil Federal Constitution of 1988 with 1996 reforms),178 as well as
legislation arising therefrom.
United Nations treaties and
instruments ratified include the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR),179 the International Covenant of Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),180 the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR),181 the Convention on the Elimination

178

C.F. (Braz. 1988) (con reformas de 1996). Full text of the document
is accessible through Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service
Center for Latin American Studies Political Database of the Americas at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/english96.html.
FIAN
International, an international membership organization that conducts
various fact-finding missions on the issues of human rights, reports that all
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been
incorporated into Brazil’s Federal Constitution of 1988.
However,
implementation of the principles occurs through regulation, and
promulgation of such laws is slow. See MONSALVE SUÁREZ ET AL., supra
note 36, at 11 n.3.
179
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/810(III) at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948),999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1057 U.N.T.S.
407.
180
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), 993
U.N.T.S. 3, S. EXEC. DOC. D, 95-2, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-19, 6 I.L.M.
360(ratified by Braz.,1992). The ICESCR recognizes rights including, but
not limited to, the right to work, id. ¶ 6, the right to fair wage, id. ¶ 7, the
right to an adequate standard of living, id. ¶ 11, and the right to education, id.
¶ 14. Each state that has ratified the convention “undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the
adoption of legislative measures.” Id. pt. II, art. 2, ¶ 1.
181
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, S. TREATY DOC. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (ratified by
Braz.,1992) (in part to protect individuals against slavery, id. pt. III, art. 8, ¶
1, and torture, id. pt. III, art. 7; as well as protect other rights associated with
the right to life, id. pt. III, art. 6; liberty, id. pt. III, art. 9; due process, id. pt.
III, art. 9, ¶ 3; and freedom of religion, id. pt. III, art. 18, ¶¶ 1–4).
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of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CEAFRD), 182 and the
Convention on Rights of the Child.183 Other treaties ratified include
the American Convention on Human Rights—known as the Pact of
San Jose—(ACHR), 184 as well as the Additional Protocol to the
ACHR in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 185
Fundamental International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions186
ratified include those on child labor187 and forced labor.188
Notwithstanding the extensive effort of the state of Brazil to
protect its citizens from human rights violations, labor conditions in
agribusiness are reported to be exploitative, degrading, and
dehumanizing. 189 Consistent with the idea of lack of choice and
meaningful work alternatives, discussed infra, FIAN International
reports that a significant number of workers released from slaverylike conditions end up returning.190 One of the reasons cited for the

182
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2106(XX) (Dec. 21,
1965), S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2, S. TREATY DOC. 95-18, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212
(ratified by Braz,, 1966) (intended to prevent all practices that create racial
discrimination, racial hatred, racial superiority (i.e. segregation, apartheid,
colonialism)) Id. pmbl.
183
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1456 (ratified by
Braz., 1990); MONSALVE SUÁREZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 11.
184
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 95-21, 9 I.L.M. 99 (ratified by Braz., 1992).
185
O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (1988), Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 67
(1992) (ratified by Braz., 1995).
186
A list of all ILO conventions ratified by Brazil can be found at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:209277928
547450::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312174:NO.
187
See, e.g., ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, C182, 17
June 1999, C182 (ratified by Braz., 2001).
188
See, e.g., ILO, Forced Labour Convention, C29, 28 June 1930, C29
(ratified by Braz., 1957).
189
See MONSALVE SUÁREZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 4, 29. See
generally U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR’S LIST OF GOODS PRODUCED BY CHILD
LABOR OR FORCED LABOR, supra note 51; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR’S 2010
FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR, supra note 51.
190
See MONSALVE SUÁREZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 18.
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discrepancy in policy and practice is geography.191 Slave labor, for
example, is reported to occur frequently in remote areas of the
country where it is invisible to the general population.192
The use of slave labor in Brazil and other sugarcane producing
countries is well documented by both governmental and nongovernmental organizations, activist organizations, and activist
scholars. 193 The former President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva, engaged the human rights issue by taking a position against
slave labor and by taking steps to eradicate its use. 194 However,
enforcement of these anti-slavery efforts has been a challenge. The
capital market is certainly hesitant to recognize a human rights issue
in the commodities trade.195 This hesitation might be intentional, or
worse, entirely unintentional, as the idea just does not enter the
market consciousness.196 However, a plausible explanation is that in
an emerging market, where there is an aggressive push to exploit a
market that the world has its eyes on, that economic policies

191

Campbell, supra note 36, at 131 (“Slave labor is typically utilized to
harvest sugarcane and to clear vast amounts of land for raising cattle and for
providing access to valuable timber.”). Others report that slave labor occurs
primarily in the cultivation of sugarcane and soybeans. PATEL, supra note 6,
at 192.
192
Campbell, supra note 36, at 131.
193
See supra note 34.
194
See generally BALES, supra note 35, at xi (explaining former
President Lula da Silva’s initiative to increase police presence to curb
slavery); MONSALVE SUÁREZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 3, 12, 38 (detailing
Lula da Silva’s National Commission for the Eradication of Slave Labour
and the National Plan for the Eradication of Slave Labour).
195
For example, listening to the Milken Institute’s conference panels
on emerging markets and bioethanol commodities, one would never know
that there is a world of inhumane activity and disparate rights sustaining the
growth and projections the journalists, CEOs, etc. are talking about. In fact,
few consider the impact that a deal has on the lives of individuals, and if they
do, it does not matter to the purpose of the deal, which is to get a return for
an investor.
See generally Global Conference, Connect: People,
Opportunities, Solutions, MILKEN INSTITUTE (2013), available at
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/events/events.taf?function=detail&cat=GC&i
d=389&eventID=GC12.
196
Id.
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stimulating that growth clash directly with human rights and
environmental concerns. 197

III. GREEN FETISH: LANGUAGE AS THE REPRODUCTION OF
POWER
Capitalism transforms society in its entirety as it
sucks people by the billions into labouring for it. It
changes the whole pattern by which humanity lives,
remoulding human nature itself. It gives a new
character to old oppressions and throws up
completely new ones.198
The message that I have sought to convey in this paper is
twofold: (1) the sugar ethanol market is based on and replicates
colonialism-era relationships as it relates to people, property, and the
environment, and (2) the position that like the colonialism-era sugar
market, sugar ethanol is in demand because a market has been
created for it by energy and agribusiness corporations. 199 The
purported benefits given by proponents of biofuel create an
acceptable appearance, which is that of the green agenda, but if one
197

See BALES, supra note 35, at 147 (“When human rights compete
with profit, profit wins.”); see also Henry Chu, Brazil’s Leftists No Longer
See President as Their Champion, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005,
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/26/world/fg-lula26; Höges, supra note
31(Brazil president dreams of a green belt). Green Tsunami and the FIAN
Report also indicate that the Brazil government has executed contracts with
other countries (Sweden, Japan, the United States) in which Brazil intends to
satisfy the biofuel demand of those countries. Interestingly, the Swedes have
included a provision against the use of slave or child labor in the production
of biofuel, and in return for the stipulation, they are paying a 5% to 10%
premium. Höges, supra note 31; MONSALVE SUÁREZ ET AL., supra note 36,
at 23–25. In fairness, however, Bales reports in the “Preface to the Revised
Edition of Disposable People”, that President da Silva “came out strongly
against the slavery that destroys the lives of many Brazilians and is also a
key element in the destruction of the country’s natural environment.” BALES,
supra note 35, at xi.
198
HARMAN, supra note 5, at 11.
199
A trade in sugar existed before it was discovered or appropriated by
the Europeans. See Schneider, supra note 2, at 311; MINTZ, supra note 4, at
xv. As discussed earlier, the market for sugar ethanol has existed in Brazil
since the 1970s. See supra note 7.
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looks closely those benefits are marginal. 200 The market has
discovered that the value of sugar is greater as fuel than it is as
food; 201 in other words, higher profit margins are delivered from
sugar when it is grown for the purpose of sustaining an energy
market versus a global food market. This phenomenon is consistent
with how capitalism is perceived to operate. In particular, Lucy
Parson’s theory on the flow of capital is instructive. 202 Parsons
described a characteristic of capital—when demand for the thing
being invested in drops, capital flows from one industry to another.203
For Parsons, “If the price of commodity falls below the cost of its
production, capital will be withdrawn from the production of this
commodity.” 204 In other words, if the price of sugar on the
commodities exchange falls below the cost associated with
converting sugarcane to sugar, and certainly if subsequent
200
The allure of biofuel seems to be twofold: first, biomass is
sustainable unlike fossil fuel, and second, greenhouse emissions are found to
be lower than that for fossil fuels. On the matter of greenhouse gas emission,
proponents of biofuel argue that biofuels release lower levels of carbon
dioxide than do fossil fuels, thus the notion that they burn “cleanly.” Robert
A. Fortunati, Alternative Fuels, Ethanol and Biofuels, Paper 16A, Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation (2007). In addition, the life cycle of
biomass creates a balance—carbon dioxide neutrality—whereby any carbon
dioxide released by the fuel is at once removed from the air by existing
biomass through the process of photosynthesis. Id. Taking into account the
entire life cycle of sugar ethanol, from growth of the cane to production of
the alcohol, sugar ethanol is found to compare favorably in terms of its
greenhouse gas emissions over fossil fuels and corn ethanol. That said, I am
unable to determine to what extent. Furthermore, I am not sure that there are
biofuels (e.g. soy) that do not require forced labor, encroach on the forests,
cause environmental degradation, and disrupt the food supply. See also
supra note 16, 36. But see, e.g., BNDES, supra note 40 (discussing sugar
ethanol favorably in all respects, but this report was funded by BNDES and
other government agencies, which have a stake in the outcome of the sugar
ethanol industry).
201
See Bolling & Suarez, supra note 8, at 2 (“[N]early half of Brazil’s
cane is grounded for ethanol.”); Valdes, supra note 9, at 9 (“In the States of
Minas Gerais, Goias, Paraná, and Mato Grosso, more sugarcane is distilled
into ethanol than is used for sugar production.”). The fact that the World
Bank detected a clear rise in global food prices and attributed that rise to the
market for biofuel, is a strong suggestion of this. See supra note 15.
202
GREER & PARSONS, supra note 38, at 735.
203
Id.
204
Id.
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consumption is inadequate, then investors will withdraw their
investment to minimize losses. The capital is then transferred to
another investment in which there is a desired return. In the case of
sugar, I would take Parson’s point further. The volatility of the price
of sugar on the open market is an indication of this dynamic. 205
When sugar fails to yield proper returns, as is necessarily the nature
of the market, investors in commodities immediately shift their
investment to a commodity that will do so. I do not argue that sugar
as food has necessarily failed to yield proper returns; however, a shift
has certainly occurred as most sugar is produced for the purpose of
producing energy.206
It is important to note here the history that sugar-dependent
economies have with this phenomenon. In her article, Seasons of
Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba,
Professor Carmen González discusses in part the disastrous boom
and bust cycles that have afflicted “sugar monocultures.” 207 The
sugar monoculture created and then sustained economies dependent
on the export of sugar. 208 For example, Cuba, the subject of
González’s piece, for over forty years exported 82% of its sugar and
devoted nearly half of its irrigable land to the growth of sugarcane,
while at once importing food and other necessities from abroad.209
This near complete dependency on sugar exports produced a volatile

205

ICE SUGAR FUTURES, supra note 122.
While I have not fully explored the depth of the emerging synthetic
market, there is an indication that it is thriving. See Agres, supra note 10;
BRONSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 56, 90 (expanding on the developing and
influential “synthetic biology” industry). I suspect that once synthetically
derived fuel substitutes begin to yield more attractive returns, the impact on
the natural market for biomass may be disastrous.
207
Carmen G. González, Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable
Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba, 16 TULANE ENV. L.J. 685, 692–95,
703–05 (2003); see also GALEANO, supra note 4, at 59. In Chapter 2, of
Open Veins, Galeano focuses on the sugar monoculture of Latin America
(largely Brazil) and the Caribbean (Cuba, Barbados, Dominican Republic,
and Haiti), and here he writes of the legacy of colonialism, that of abandoned
sugar mills, devastated lands, and severe poverty.
208
González, supra note 207, at 692–95, 703–05.
209
Id. at 692.
206
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domestic economy, one that mirrored the volatility of sugar prices on
the global commodities market.210
González demonstrates how the Cuban sugar monoculture led
to foreign control—primarily by the United States—of the Cuban
economy.211 Ultimately, once Cuban relations with the United States
deteriorated, resulting in embargo, Cuba had to look to private

210
See Id. Radio addresses given by Fidel Castro to the Cuban
populace in January 1965 and May 1970 are instructive on the complexity,
unpredictable nature, and general difficulties plaguing the cultivation of
sugarcane. In an address given on January 22, 1965 in Spanish over the
Havana Domestic Radio and Television Service, Castro said, “The sugarcane
harvest is important to our economy. To win the battle of the sugarcane
harvest is to win the battle of the economy, for it means the development of
the sugar industry, with its objective of producing 10 million tons of sugar by
1970.” Fidel Castro, Meeting with Union & Sugar Industry Leaders, Radio
address on Havana Domestic Radio (Jan. 22, 1965) (transcript available at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1965/19650122.html).
In this
particular speech Castro calls for mechanization as well as addresses the very
significant role that Cubans have in the very important sugar harvest. Id.
However, it is the 1970 report on the sugar harvest where we understand the
challenges. “It is not as easy to run a mill as it is to run a cable car or a
bicycle.” Fidel Castro, Premier Castro 20 May Report on Sugar Harvest,
Radio address on Havana Domestic Radio (May 21, 1970) (transcript
available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1970/19700521.html).
Problems concerning “yields” due to “daily grinding” issues, excessive rains
in certain geographic areas, or other issues related to the operation of the
mills or capital expenditures associated with the mills, are specifically
discussed. A sense of urgency certainly comes through the text. Castro is
very specific about issues affecting output and effective competition with
what he calls the “capitalist harvest.” Id. at 5, 12, 22. In particular, the May
20 speech contains a very clear and transparent discussion about the profit
differentials between trade agreements, or privately negotiated agreements
between Cuba and say, the Soviet Union, to purchase surplus sugar, and the
free market.
Castro concludes that “Sugar prices vary—generally,
agreement prices are higher than free market prices.” Cuba’s approach at
that time is heavily dependent on trade agreements. Noteworthy for me is
the capitalistic tone of the speeches. While I focused on two specifically
associated with the sugar crop, Castro is aggressive in his talk about business
deals. Id.
211
See González, supra note 207, at 693, 703–04.
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contracts with other countries, namely the Soviet Union and China,
to fill the extensive gap in sugar export.212
* * *
With the sugar ethanol industry, sugar has thus reemerged as an
item of desire, although not in the sense of a fetish for the sweet (or
even the green fetish). The energy market that has been developing,
growing, and evolving since the mid-2000s, satisfies a fetish for
profit.
The term profit has no intrinsic meaning; no word does.213 The
meaning attributed to the term profit—how it is derived, who is
entitled to it—is designed to construct a truth, often passed off as a
scientific or “natural” (rule of god) truth, that serves specific interests
and reproduces particular ideologies. 214 Profit from a finance
perspective, which is how I know it, is the positive difference
between revenues that are generated by business activity in excess of
the costs (both operating and capital in form) associated with that
activity. That basic definition, however, has been located within a
purposeful understanding of capital and production that intentionally
underestimates, or in the case of slavery or forced labor, eliminates,
the value of labor in producing profit. My intent in this section is to

212

Id. at 704.
CHRIS WEEDON, FEMINIST PRACTICE & POSTSTRUCTURALIST THEORY
22 (1st ed. 1987) (“[L]anguage, far from reflecting an already given social
reality, constitutes social reality for us. Neither social reality nor the ‘natural’
world has fixed intrinsic meanings which language reflects or expresses.”);
see also MINTZ, supra note 4, at 157 (“Where does the locus of meaning
reside? For most human beings most of the time, the meanings believed to
inhere in things and in the relationships among things and acts are not given
but, rather, are learned.”).
214
See MINTZ, supra note 4, at 152–53
The other sort of meaning can be grasped when one
considers what consumption, and its proliferated
meanings for the participants, can signify for a society as
a whole, and especially for those who rule it; how those
who govern or control the society perpetuate their status
and profit from the intensified diffusion of inside
meanings, and of the consumption which the validations
of these meanings entail. . . . [T]he simultaneous control
of both the foods themselves and the meanings they are
made to connote can be a means to pacific domination.
213
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explore that ideology and offer a new approach, or rethinking of
profit that reflects the value that truly goes into production.215
Language, how we think (or learn to think) about things, define
relationships and ideas, creates and solidifies a power-structure. 216
The illusion of equality, for example, reinforced by the idea of
private contract begins to convey this point. The notion of consent
and private contract creates a language of equality that sustains the
mechanisms of inequality.217 As discussed earlier, when one party
has control of the production process, and another has no control, and
certainly no alternatives for meaningful work, there is no equal
bargaining power, an important element in contract formation. 218
Therefore, if we stop thinking of the relationship of exploited
agricultural workers as one in private contract, then we are better

215
SMITH, supra note 5, at 32 (“But though labour be the real measure
of the exchangeable value of all commodities, it is not that by which their
value is commonly estimated.”). The problem for Smith is how labor is
valued. For Smith, labor is “an abstract notion, which though it can be made
sufficiently intelligible, is not altogether so natural and obvious.” Id. So, in
my proposal that we rethink profit, I acknowledge the challenge of first, how
do we value the labor of a cane-cutter that has a ten- to fifteen-year work
span? And then, is there a way to get past the theory (i.e. abstraction) and
price labor fairly?
216
See MINTZ, supra note 4, at 152–53.
217
See HARTMAN, supra note 3. Saidya Hartman examines the illusory
nature of the liberty of contract as related to black, newly-freed slaves in the
United States:
The liberty of contract, however illusory, could not be
disassociated from the imposition of forms of
involuntary servitude facilitated by Black Codes,
vagrancy laws, the convict-labor system, the criminal
surety system, breach-of-contract laws, and the share
system. Moreover, even those wage laborers operating
under presumably ideal conditions of the ‘free market’
were unable to enjoy the fruits of their labor. The liberty
of contract dissimulated the inequality at the heart of the
exchange.
Id. at 147.
218
See HARMAN, supra note 5, at 31–32 (“The relation between the
employer and the worker had the appearance of being between
equals. . . .Yet the surface appearance of equality hid a deeper inequality.”).
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able to see the relationship shrouded in inequality and to address that
inequality.219
In the context of labor, the structure of power is reproduced in
the way that the value of labor is considered within the understanding
of profit. For the existing definition of profit to have any efficacy,
labor must be minimized in terms of value. This is achieved by
defining labor as less significant than capital—as less than property.
We equate the value of labor to the wage, which is by nature less
than its true worth.220 Thus, by constructing labor as something less
than property, the worker’s worth is significantly altered (effectively
dispossessed of power and control). 221 That valuation then,
conveniently occurs through a different market (the wage market,
which seeks to pay as close to nothing for work).222 If labor is not
defined as property, the value of labor is misrepresented as the wage,
as opposed to being represented through the thing that labor has
transformed into having productive value. And ultimately the laborer
is structurally placed in a subservient bargaining position (which is
the heart of the coercive nature of capital).
The impact is a powerful shift in perspective, one that
establishes apparent socio-political-economic positions: The
agricultural worker needs the capitalist to survive, rather than the
capitalist needing the worker. 223 This creates the sense that the
capitalist is doing the worker a favor by letting him or her cut cane
219

See MONSALVE SUÁREZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 61–63 (making
short- and long-term recommendations to the Brazilian state as it relates to
the human right to work, right to food, and the environment (particularly for
rural and indigenous populations), and making the following
recommendation to the international community: “Reconsider all incentive
policies, such as the mandatory targets of replacing fossil fuels by agrofuels,
considering the serious negative social and environmental impacts the
expansion of this industry will have on Brazil as a leading country in this
sector.”).
220
The wage market intentionally seeks to pay the “cheapest” wage.
See generally Spivak, supra note 33.
221
See REIMAN & LEIGHTON, supra note 30, at 228 (“Capitalists and
workers have the same right of property; they just happen to own different
things.”).
222
See HARMAN, supra note 5, at 29 (“[The workers] get paid a wage,
while their labour produces goods that are the property of those who control
the means of production.”).
223
Id. at 33.
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all day, when in fact the worker is providing the labor necessary for
the capitalist to make profit. And this is whether the worker is
actually cutting cane or working a machine that cuts the cane.
The challenge for me is how to determine the intrinsic value of
labor in a way that is more authentic than the wage.224 But really,
there is no challenge. What there is, however, is a shift in thinking.
Thus, how do we ascertain the intrinsic value of an agricultural
worker whose labor consists of cutting cane in the heat for more than
the average work-day? The work span of such worker is short, given
the violence imposed on the body from repetitive motion. We can
either decide to value that short work span ‘cheaply,’ with a presentvalue formula, which favors wealth creation at the capital level. Or
we can value that short work span ‘expensively’, or in my opinion,
the correct valuation accounts for the effect of a present-value
formula that shifts wealth from capital to the worker, whose hard
labor is necessary in production.225
224
Adam Smith, the purported father of neoclassical economics,
discussed the role of labor in the determination of profit, and while he
conceded that the matter was incredibly abstract he also placed great weight
on labor’s value and recognized that while labor creates exchange-value,
exchange-value is not considered in determining the value of labor. See
SMITH, supra note 5, at 32 (“But though labour be the real measure of the
exchangeable value of all commodities, it is not that by which their value is
commonly estimated. . . . an abstract notion, which though it can be made
sufficiently intelligible, is not altogether so natural and obvious.”).
225
If we are talking about mechanized cultivation, then the value of the
worker necessarily increases given the longer work span and the more
involved skill necessary to work a machine. Regardless, the worker is
utilizing his or her property, labor, in the creation of the ultimate product.
Also, for a moment I was challenged with classification—do I classify the
value of labor as in-kind capital contribution, thereby exposing the worker to
risks associated with that level of ownership and the particular product (i.e.
volatility of sugar). But ultimately, I do not think it is my obligation to
determine how labor should be classified because then I would continue the
ideology that removes control from the laborer. The agricultural worker
creates value with his or her labor, and part of equalizing bargaining
positions in the “private contract” would be to restore control to the worker.
He or she decides how their labor should be classified and thus wealth
returned to them. See MINTZ, supra note 4, at 57 (“Slaves and forced
laborers, unlike free workers, have nothing to sell, not even their labor;
instead, they have themselves been bought and sold and traded.”).
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In my research for this paper, I have come across an interesting
conclusion: Free labor is “cheaper” than slave labor. Following the
current mode of thought, yes, slave labor was more expensive given
the capital-intensive nature of the production. But if I stop to think
about the underlying subtext in this assertion, I realize how this
thought perpetuates certain modes of thought that sustain ideology by
making us think that the current way is a natural state. For example,
invoking Gayatri Spivak: “Human labor is not, of course,
intrinsically ‘cheap’ or ‘expensive[.]’ An absence of labor laws (or a
discriminatory enforcement of them), a totalitarian state . . . and
minimal subsistence requirements on the part of the worker will
ensure it.”226
Spivak is essentially calling out a business and legal context that
artificially establishes a truth that recreates power structures.227 In
other words, “cheap” is not a given, but a dynamic created by legal
and institutional arrangements that permit power-relations to be
accepted as neutral and then natural, and enable the Global North to
profit from slave labor while evading both moral and legal
responsibility. I invoke Robert Heilbroner to make the following
point: “So it is that we ‘obey’ the rhythms of the machine and dance
to the tune of money, hardly aware that we are following the dictates
of a social, not a natural, imperative.”228
I recognize the challenges in my proposal, given the many
interests involved in global business relationships. However,
rethinking the definition of profit, or how the components of profit
are defined, is absolutely necessary because the reality is that the
current notion of profits as relates to agricultural is an inaccurate
representation of the role of capital in determining value. 229
226

Spivak, supra note 33, at 83.
See WEEDON, supra note 213, at 28:
Profit is made by paying labour less than the value which
it produces. The worker has no alternative than to work
for as little as the employer pays her. Yet, in the
dominant liberal discourses of capitalist society, this
oppressive relationship between capital and labour is
represented as a free contract between rational, sovereign
individuals.
(echoing the same points regarding the illusory private contract).
228
See HEILBRONER, supra note 3, at 117.
229
REIMAN & LEIGHTON, supra note 30, at 221 (citing Marx’s
explanation of the uniqueness of labor-power: “Labor-power, however, has
227
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Certainly in agriculture, as relates to Global North–Global South
relations, profit has in the past represented the theft of labor and
continues to be represented now. As I discuss in my conclusion, I
recognize that there are complexities to these relationships, and what
I am not considering here specifically is the role that the elite of
Brazil, or those in control of sugar mills, have in contributing to
modern-day colonialism conditions. 230 However, any idea can be
dismantled if one drills down to the details. Ultimately, I think this is
the story of the Global North and the Global South, and the demand
on Brazil to produce sugar ethanol for the world is driven by the
capital market, which is controlled by the Global North.
* * *
A shift in law and policy occurs first through language.231 The
question is whether change will produce a reallocation of wealth and
resources. 232 What profits are, and who is entitled to them, is
the unique capacity to produce more value than its own”); see also MINTZ,
supra note 4, at 30–31 (discussing the same idea on the unique quality of
labor-power).
230
I find support from the work of B.S. Chimni, who would argue that
neoliberal economic policies have created a global bourgeoisie in both the
Global North and South that facilitates the dominant role of transnational
capital and creates extremes of wealth and poverty. See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, A
Just World Under Law: A View from the South, 100 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 2,
17–24 (2006).
231
WEEDON, supra note 213, at 22 (“[L]anguage, far from reflecting an
already given social reality, constitutes social reality for us. Neither social
reality nor the ‘natural’ world has fixed intrinsic meanings which language
reflects or expresses.”).
232
COASE, supra note 19, at 173 (“The question which then has to be
considered is whether, through its influence on demand, a change in the
criteria for assigning ownership to previously unrecognized rights could
bring about a different allocation of resources.”). For me, Professor Coases’s
position is compelling. If the proposed solution influences no meaningful
change, then the solution is not really a solution. Often attorneys and
scholars propose additional disclosure as the solution for some problems.
See generally Anderson, supra note 73 (proposing disclosure as a means for
transparency in foreign direct investment). While there is value to
transparency, I find that disclosure is quite often ineffectual and meaningless.
Disclosure conveys the idea that transparency creates choice for investors
and produces change in conduct. So as it relates to human rights violations,
the idea is that if this “soft information” is to be required in disclosure


350

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 9.2

therefore controlled by capital and the ideology that it seeks to ensure
and replicate. In the context of the sugar trade, the laborer, the
Amazon, and the community that sugar production touches and
affects, are not factored into the formula that calculates profits. If
these elements were part of the calculation, profits would not be what
they are because wealth created from production would stay in the
location of production (as opposed to being transferred abroad),233
and the concept of “emerging market” would disappear.

CONCLUSION
In her essay Can the Subaltern Speak, Spivak critiques those
whom she calls the leftist intellectuals in their practice of speaking
for the oppressed (the subaltern) in a totalizing theory without
considering the experience of the subaltern from her perspective, her
point of view.234 I begin with this idea because I think it speaks to
the complexity (some will call it an intellectual flaw) that I have
encountered in writing this article. I have arguably simplified the
relationships that are formed by the sugar trade, and I have done so
without considering all the narratives that form multiple experiences.
This article has referred to the theoretical or mythical dichotomies of
slave and master, laborer and manager, the property-less and the
property-owner, and I have referred to them in a totalizing way, as if
they are each a uniform basket of good or evil. Spivak articulates
this problem:
“[T]he relationship between global capitalism
documents, companies would have incentive to end the practices. However,
disclosure does not bring about a reallocation of resources where rights have
not previously been recognized. Disclosure is ineffective at producing
meaningful change because it merely goes toward the pricing of equity on
the market. Investors, for example, are fully aware of the human rights
violations of Cosan and Brenco. While not reported in disclosure documents,
the violations are reported by various governmental and nongovernmental
organizations. Investors are generally unmoved by these violations because
investors care about getting the maximum return on their investment—in
deriving additional property from property. If the fine imposed on the
company does not materially impact the investment, then it is insignificant.
233
See MINTZ, supra note 4, at 43 (“The wealth they created mostly
returned to Britain; the products they made were consumed in Britain; and
the products made by Britons—cloth, tools, torture instruments—were
consumed by slaves who were themselves consumed in the creation of
wealth.”).
234
Spivak, supra note 33, at 74, 75.
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(exploitation in economics) and nation-state alliances (domination in
geopolitics) is so macrological that it cannot account for the
micrological texture of power.”235 In other words, as relates to this
piece, the relationships that come together in the market for sugar or
sugar ethanol are beyond the dualistic “Self–Other” relationship.236
There are hierarchies created within hierarchies. And within each
hierarchy, there is a dominant group for whom the greater ideology
benefits, notwithstanding that within each layer of hierarchy, not all
positions of power are equal. 237 For example, the first hierarchy
occurs with the division between the Global North (historically
privileged on a global scale, with access to capital) and the Global
South (historically unprivileged on a global scale, with access to the
natural resource but unable to develop without access to capital).
However, like a matryoshka doll, within the Global North and the
Global South are layers upon layers of hierarchy that define human
relations and power structures.
While I concede that this article has perhaps approached issues
in a totalizing way, I argue any error in that respect conveys a
necessary theme—that within each layer of hierarchy there is a
common language of profit, one historically dictated by the language
of the Global North. By embracing the demand for sugar ethanol, the
powers of Brazil have adopted the language of the financially

235

Id.
The Self is the unit of or with access to power. The Other is created
by the Self, to ensure that power. For example, in the context of race, the
idea of the Self/Other is the idea that whiteness cannot exist, and therefore
creates, blackness. Without a continued black construct, whiteness cannot
exist. For me, one of the more powerful articulations of this comes from
Sartre. See SARTRE, supra note 34, at 13 (“If the Jew did not exist, the antiSemite would invent him.”).
237
See Imani Perry, Cultural Studies, Critical Race Theory and Some
Reflections on Methods, 50 VILL. L. REV. 915, 916 n.4 (2005) (describing
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, where “dominant groups in a society
maintain their dominance by the persuasion and consent of subordinated
groups”). See generally Douglass Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the
Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 515 (2000) (examining the influence that Gramsci’s
concept of hegemony (power structures) has had on various critical
scholarship).
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superior, in order to achieve superiority itself.238 In other words, in
Brazil’s desire to create a “green tsunami,” and by giving foreign
capital significant access to (and maybe even control of) the
production of sugar (for the purpose of ethanol), the state has
essentially adopted, condoned, recreated, and given efficacy to that
structure that locates power in capital and one which says that profit
must necessarily be derived from exploitation and deprivation of
wealth. Yet Brazil—as the location of the world’s most significant
sugarcane crop, and as the dominant producer of sugar and ethanol—
is in a unique position to negotiate with the various corporate
interests (largely foreign) seeking to exploit its resources. However,
through the existing paradigm—in which relationships are marked by
private contract but in substance are really bondage—the colonial
legacy of sugar production in Brazil remains strong.
The reemergence of sugar trade represents restlessness within
capitalism 239 —the tension between (1) embracing a global green
movement intended to reduce carbon emissions and (2) abandoning
traditional forms of profit generation in the energy sector. In other
words, through a modern progressive movement toward alternative
energy, human exploitation and environmental destruction are
sustained and reproduced.

238

See generally FANON, supra note 21. Thus, the language of profit
cleverly creates formal equality while sustaining and reproducing inequality.
See also Darder, supra note 10, at 852.
239
Chris Harman states “Capitalism is a restless system . . .
Competitive accumulation remoulds everything it touches and then, when it
has hardly finished, remoulds it all again.” HARMAN, supra note 5, at 326.

